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ABSTRACT
Many applications today rely on location information, yet disclosing such information can
present heightened privacy and safety risks. A person’s whereabouts, for example, may reveal
sensitive private information such as health condition and lifestyle. Location information also
has the potential to allow an adversary to physically locate and destroy a subject, which is
particularly concerned in digital battlefields.
This research investigates two problems. The first one is location privacy protection in
location-based services. Our goal is to provide a desired level of guarantee that the location
data collected by the service providers cannot be correlated with restricted spaces such as
home and office to derive who’s where at what time. We propose 1) leveraging historical lo-
cation samples for location depersonalization and 2) allowing a user to express her location
privacy requirement by identifying a spatial region. With these two ideas in place, we develop
a suite of techniques for location-privacy aware uses of location-based services, which can be
either sporadic or continuous. An experimental system has been implemented with these tech-
niques. The second problem investigated in this research is location safety protection in ad
hoc networks. Unlike location privacy intrusion, the adversary here is not interested in finding
the individual identities of the nodes in a spatial region, but simply wants to locate and de-
stroy them. We define the safety level of a spatial region as the inverse of its node density and
develop a suite of techniques for location safety-aware cloaking and routing. These schemes
allow nodes to disclose their location as accurately as possible, while preventing such informa-
tion from being used to identify any region with a safety level lower than a required threshold.
The performance of the proposed techniques is evaluated through analysis and simulation.
1CHAPTER 1. Introduction
With the continuous price dropping and miniaturization of positioning systems such as
GPS, more and more applications in wireless networks have taken advantage of location in-
formation of wireless users and devices in their design and development. However, disclosing
location information can presents heightened privacy and safety risks. In the aspect of pri-
vacy, physical destinations such as medical clinics may indicate a person’s health problems.
Likewise, regular stops at certain types of places may be linked directly to one’s lifestyles or
political associations. In the aspect of safety, knowing the position of a wireless device allows
an adversary to locate and physically destroy the subject, which is particularly concerned in
digital battlefields.
Our research in this thesis aims to address the above threats presented by location exposure.
Specifically, we investigate two problems. The first one is location privacy protection in
the context of location-based services (LBSs). Too use an LBS, a user needs to submit her
location to the service provider, which may not be trustworthy in keeping the information in
confidential. Even if a user replaces her real-world identity with a pseudonym, the anonymous
location information may still be correlated with restricted spaces such as house and office
for subject re-identification. Our research focuses on this problem known as restricted space
identification, and investigates location depersonalization for the purpose of location privacy
protection. Specifically, given an anonymous location disclosed in a service request, we want
to prevent an adversary from deriving who was in the location at the time of the service request.
Toward this goal, we propose to explore users’ historical location samples, each called a
footprint, for location depersonalization. A spatial region with K different footprints means it
2has been visited byK different people. When a user requests a service, her location is reported
as such a region instead of her accurate position. Therefore, even if an adversary manages to
identify all these visitors using restricted spaces, he will not know which of them was inside the
area at the time of the service request. In addition to location depersonalization, we address
the challenge of modeling location privacy requirement. With the traditional K-anonymity
model, a user needs to specify a value of K as her privacy requirement. This is problematic,
because privacy is about feeling, and it is awkward for one to scale her feeling using a number.
Our solution circumvents this problem by allowing a user to identify a public region, such as
a shopping mall, which she would feel comfortable that it is reported as her location should
she request a service inside it. This region is then used as her privacy requirement – each
location disclosed on her behalf needs to be at least as popular as that area. Compared to
choosing a number of K, this feeling-based strategy provides a much more intuitive way for
users to express their privacy requirement. With the above ideas in place, we present a suite of
cloaking algorithms to depersonalize users’ location disclosed in both sporadic and continuous
LBSs. We evaluate the performance of our techniques via simulations. Moreover, we have
implemented an experimental prototype for feasibility and practicality study.
The second problem investigated in this thesis is location safety protection in the context
of ad hoc networks. Many applications and protocols (e.g., LAR (1), DREAM (2), GPSR (3))
designed for ad hoc networks take advantage of node location information for functionality
and scalability. Little work, however, has been done to deal with the safety threat introduced
when nodes disclose their location information in a hostile environment. Knowing a spatial
region contains a set of sensors, an adversary may comb through the area to locate and destroy
all of them. This threat is different from location privacy intrusion in the sense that here the
adversary is not interested in finding the individual identities of the nodes in a spatial region,
but simply wants to locate and destroy them.
The specific goal of thwarting the location safety threat is to make it practically infeasible
for an adversary to find nodes’ accurate position based on the location information they dis-
3close in communications. An adversary can always comb through an entire region to destroy
the nodes located inside it, but if the area is very large, the cost can be prohibitively high.
As such, we define the safety level of a spatial region as the inverse of its node density. The
higher safety level a spatial region has, the less attractive it is for the adversary to attack the
nodes inside. With this concept, we developed a set of distributed algorithms for nodes to
cloak their location in both stationary and mobile ad hoc networks. Our strategy is to partition
the network domain into a number of safe subdomains that is as small as possible, and let
each node take the subdomain where it resides in as its cloaking box. To make subdomains as
small as possible, each subdomain is recursively split as long as the resulted subdomains are
all safe. We evaluate the performance of our techniques through both mathematical analysis
and simulation.
The above cloaking techniques protect nodes’ location safety by reducing their location
resolution. This, unfortunately, has a significant impact on the geographic routing protocols
in ad hoc networks. We show that the routing operation of packet forwarding may allow an
adversary to refine a node’s location resolution, thus reversing the effect of location cloaking
on safety protection. To address this issue, we introduce a new concept called safe link. A
network link is said to be a safe link if the packet delivery through the link does not allow
an adversary to refine the sender and receiver’s location resolution. Based on the concept, we
first propose a verification technique that allows a node to determine whether or not a link
is safe based on the received signal strength. Then, we develop a secure geographic routing
protocol (LSR). LSR constructs a routing path using only safe links, and it delivers packets
to destination nodes without knowing their accurate location information. To our knowledge,
LSR is the first ad hoc routing technique designed with built-in mechanisms to support location
safety protection.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. We discuss the background and related work
in Chapter 2. We present our research for location privacy and location safety protection in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. Finally, we conclude this thesis in Chapter 5.
4CHAPTER 2. Related work
This chapter surveys existing techniques closely related to our work. These pieces of
work were also proposed to protect users’ sensitive information from being revealed in the
disclosed locations in communications. In Section 2.1, we present regulation and policy-based
approaches for safeguarding personal location information. In Section 2.2, we discuss existing
techniques proposed for anonymous uses of LBSs. In Section 2.3, we discuss a novel approach
which can be used for location privacy protection since it does not need users disclose their
location for requesting LBSs. In Section 2.4 and 2.5 we address trajectory perturbation and
trajectory anonymization used to prevent a user being identified from a location trajectory
revealed in continuous LBSs respectively. In Section 2.6, we present privacy protection in
opportunistic sensing and monitoring. In Section 2.7, we shift our focus on ad hoc networks,
and surveys existing anonymous routing protocols.
2.1 Regulation and policy-based approaches for location data
protection
Various efforts have been made toward safeguarding personal location data. On the legis-
lation front, laws and regulations governing collection and distribution of the location infor-
mation of wireless subscribers have been or are in the process of being enacted in a number of
regions, including the United States, the European Union, and Japan (4). Technical standards
for location data transmission have been investigated by the Internet Engineering Task Force’s
Geopriv working group (5). The group focuses on protocol designs that allow mobile devices
5to communicate their location in a private and secure fashion.
Several policy-based approaches (e.g., (6; 7; 8)) have also been developed for personal
location management, by which users can configure their mobile devices when and to whom
their location information can be released. The work in (6) focuses on Automotive Telematics,
which are information intensive applications using mobile vehicles as the sensing, computing
and communication platform. Dynamic data generated by automobiles creates unique chal-
lenges for privacy protection. Unlike static data, which has to be collected only once by any
interested party, dynamic data has to be collected repeatedly by a telematic service provider
to keep it up-to-date. Thus, continuously reporting location information to the untrustworthy
service providers presents a serious threat on users’ privacy. In the proposed framework, user
can configure their privacy policy to withhold their precise location information, and only re-
port accumulative information. For example, users are not allowed to report their accurate
positions, but can report the mileage of their recent travel.
The framework LocServ proposed in (7) lets users apply general policies to control distri-
bution of their information. The policies let users restrictly access to their location information
in several ways: 1) Service type. A user only reports her location in requesting certain types of
service. 2) Time limit. A user only reports her location at certain time periods, which can vary
on workdays and holidays. 3) Location limit. A user only reports her location in specified ge-
ographic areas. In addition, a standard xml format is defined for users to submit their privacy
policy statement to validators which validate the user preference against system policy.
The work in (8) considers a ubiquitous computing environment which contains a number
of services. Each service has a policy proxy which beacons the service description and data
collection policies to every user entering the environment. Upon receiving a beacon, the user’s
personal privacy proxy extracts the policies from the beacon and compares them with the
user’s own privacy preference. After the comparison, the privacy proxy will help user to
decide whether accept or decline the service. Specifically, a service is acceptable only if it can
support mechanisms to encode the location information in the collected data and can enforce
6access restrictions based on the location of the person wanting to use the data.
Although these approaches protect location privacy from various aspects, they do not work
when users have to release their location information to a party that is not trustworthy in
keeping the data in confidential.
2.2 Anonymous uses of LBSs
Just like regular Internet access, a user may not want to be identified as the subscriber of
some LBS, especially when the service is sensitive. To achieve anonymous uses of LBSs, the
user’s location disclosed to the service provider has to be prevented from being linked to her
identity. This problem was first investigated in (9), and a solution is proposed by introducing
the concept of locationK-anonymity in the context of LBSs. LocationK-anonymity demands
that the user’s location information reported to the service provider should be indistinguishable
from at least K − 1 other users. To achieve K-anonymity protection, the proposed scheme
reduces the accuracy of the location information along spatial and/or temporal dimensions
before it is disclosed to the service provider. Specifically, when a client requests a service, a
quadtree-based algorithm is applied to compute a cloaking box that contains the client and at
leastK−1 others, and then uses this cloaking box as the client’s location to request the service.
If the resolution is too coarse for quality services, temporal cloaking is applied, i.e., delaying
a user’s service request. When more mobile nodes come near to the user, a smaller cloaking
area can then be computed. The concept of location K-anonymity has since been improved
by a series of work. In the rest of this section, we review them in different categories.
Customizable location K-anonymity: The work in (10) address the disadvantages of the
cloaking technique proposed in (9). First, (9) uses a system-wide static K value to anonymize
all users, which is unrealistic in practice as users tend to have varying privacy requirements
under different contexts. Instead, this paper introduces a customizable K-anonymity model
that allows each user to specify her own value of K. In addition, the quadtree-based algorithm
7used in (9) suffers from poor service quality because the generated cloaking boxes have low
resolution, while in this paper a CliqueCloak algorithm is proposed to compute cloaking boxes
as small as possible. The algorithm first constructs a graph, in which a vertex corresponds to
a user’s location, and an edge between two vertices means the two corresponding users can
share a cloaking box. Then, the algorithm searches for cliques of K vertices and the minimum
bounding rectangle (MBR) of them is computed as the users’ cloaking box.
The work in (11) and (12) consider preventing an adversary from identifying a subject
based on her historical moving pattern. These pieces of work introduce the notion of historical
K-anonymity which defines the requirement to preserve locationK-anonymity for a trajectory
of service queries submitted by the same user. Based on this definition, a spatial-temporal
cloaking algorithm is proposed. For each location update in a trajectory, a three dimensional
(two spatial dimension and one temporal dimension) MBR that is crossed by K − 1 other
users is built and these MBRs form a cloaking trajectory. In addition, a probabilistic unlinking
technique is presented which prevents adversaries from linking the service requests submitted
by a same user at different time.
Query processing with reduced location resolution: In an anonymized service query
received by a LBS provider, the location is cloaked into a spatial region. The cloaked location
information brings up the challenges of query processing, i.e., how to provide efficient and
accurate LBSs based on the knowledge of the spatial region rather than the exact location
information. This issue motivates a series of work (13; 14; 15). In (13), a probabilistic model
is proposed to process the queries with cloaked location data. It generates imprecise answers to
the user, each of which is a tuple (S, P ) where S is the service content and P is the probability
that the answer satisfies the corresponding query. In addition, it defines several metrics for
evaluating the quality of a service based on the imprecise answers. These metrics allow a user
to decide whether she should adjust her cloaked location in order to obtain a better service.
The work in (14) addresses the challenge of processing queries over private data, i.e., the
location information of the querying target is also inaccurate. Specifically, this paper focuses
8on nearest neighbor (NN) query processing, and a grid-based algorithm is proposed to find
the minimum set of candidates for an NN query. The main idea of the algorithm is to initially
select a set of filter objects that can be used to prune the search over the whole set of object.
With the filter objects, the algorithm can identify the spatial region which covers all potential
answers to an NN query regardless of the exact location of objects in their cloaking boxes.
The work in (15) focuses on k nearest neighbor (kNN) query processing, and it addresses
the challenge of query processing when the cloaked location is a circular region. An algorithm
called CkNN-Circ is proposed to compute the candidate list of query results. Specifically, the
algorithm partitions the circumference of the circular cloaking region into disjoint arcs, and
associates to each arc the data objects nearest to it. In addition, it shows that compared with
query processing on rectangular cloaking boxes, CkNN-Circ has a higher overhead but it can
reduce the number of candidates, which means that using circular cloaking box is preferable
in the situation when communication cost is more important than processing cost.
Anonymous uses of LBSs in P2P environments: In all the above techniques, a central
anonymization server is used as a trusted middle-ware between mobile nodes and service
providers. The server tracks the movement of mobile nodes and computes cloaking boxes
upon requests. On the other hand, some pieces of work (16; 17; 18; 19; 20) have investigated
anonymous uses of LBS in fully distributed mobile peer-to-peer environments. Compared to
the centralized framework, the cloaking box computation in P2P system does not rely on the
anonymization server. Thus, it is free from the problem of server bottleneck or single point
of failure. In (16), before a user send a request to the LBS provider, she finds a group of
peers in her neighborhood via single-hop and/or multi-hop routing. Then, the spatial cloaked
region that covers the entire group of peers is computed as her location for requesting service.
The proposed P2P cloaking algorithm operates in two modes: 1) on-demand in which mobile
clients execute the algorithm only when they need to request an LBS; 2) proactive in which
mobile clients periodically look around to find the desired group of peers for cloaking. The
on-demand mode has lower power consumption, while the proactive mode can achieve faster
9service response. The P2P system proposed in (17) is called MOBIHIDE. It manages the
mobile users with a hierarchical distributed hash table based on Chord architecture (21). In
addition, it employs the Hillbert space-filling curve to map the 2-D user locations to a 1-
D Chord space. With the assist of such curve, peers can compute their cloaking boxes by
choosing random groups of K users (including the service user) that are consecutive in the
1-D space.
The work in (18; 19) assumes that users’ actual positions are publicly known. Thus, to
protect users’ anonymity, each cloaking box should have the K-sharing property, i.e., it must
satisfy that 1) at least K users are contained by the cloaking box and 2) at least K of these
users share the same cloaking box. The system PRIVE in (18) uses the Hilbert transforma-
tion to generate a sorted 1-D sequence of all users. Then, it constructs fixed partitions of K
users each, and the minimum bounding rectangle (MBR) of all the users in a partition is the
cloaking box for these users. To generate the fixed partitions, PRIVE implements an overlay
network which resembles a distributed B+-tree. Since every time the search for a cloaking
box starts from the root of the tree, the peer at the root can be overloaded. The work in
(19) focuses on the anonymity protection in continuous LBSs, where the adversary can attack
users’ anonymity based on their historical movement. At the initial timestamp, the proposed
algorithm computes the service user a cloaking box which contains at least K users. Then, at
a subsequent timestamp, the algorithm computes a new cloaking box which encloses the same
set of users. The drawback of this technique is obvious. As users move, the resulting cloaking
box can grow very large, leading to prohibitively low service quality.
Despite their difference, all the above P2P systems assume mobile nodes trust each other
and require nodes to disclose exact location to their neighbors. In contrast the technique
(20) allows nodes to collaborate in computing cloaking boxes without having to reveal their
exact location. Specifically, the cloaking process contains two phases. In the first phase, K
users (including the service user) are grouped together according to the proximity location
information, the distance between a user and its 1-hop neighbors. In the second phase, the
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bounding box of the group of users is obtained without exposing their accurate positions. To
achieve this goal, the proposed technique extend Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) (22),
and a public function is used for all the users in the group to evaluate a candidate bound with
their private positions while ensuring no users can learn additional information other than the
evaluation results.
All the above techniques described in this section are designed to preserve users’ anonymity
in service uses, but not their location privacy. Each cloaking box contains a set of users who
are currently inside the area. By correlating with restricted spaces, an adversary has the po-
tential to identify all these users. The adversary may not know which of them requests the
service, but knows they are all inside the area at the time when the service is requested, thus
violating their location privacy. As compared to a single user’s location, revealing the pres-
ence of a group of people together in a small area is even more threatening – it is well said that
”where you are and whom you are with are closely correlated with what you are doing” (23).
2.3 Non-location exposure uses of LBS
The work in (24) proposes a novel framework to let a user directly download location-
based information from a service provider without having to report her location informa-
tion (either accurate position or cloaking box). The proposed technique does not need an
anonymizer. It is based on the theory of Private Information Retrieval (PIR) (25), which al-
lows a user to privately retrieve information from a server database, without letting the server
learn what particular information the user has requested. Specifically, this framework imple-
ments PIR for nearest neighbor (NN) service requests based on the Hilbert curve and on an
R-tree variant. It shows that for a server database which contains n point of interests (POIs),
the user can securely find her NN by downloading O(
√
n) of them.
This technique can be used to provide users location privacy protection, since a user does
not need to disclose any location information to the service provider. For each query, however,
11
this scheme requires a mobile client to download about the square root of the total amount of
data stored in the service provider. This requirement will present a major burden to a mobile
client when the database is large.
2.4 Trajectory perturbation
A user’s time-series sequence of location updates creates a trajectory. One can associate
each location update with a different pseudonym; but using different pseudonyms or simply
not using identifiers at all may not be effective, because successive location samples are highly
correlative and could be re-linked using trajectory tracking methods. For example, Multi Tar-
get Tracking (MTT) (26) algorithms are a well-studied technique to link subsequent location
samples to individual users who periodically report anonymized location information.
Beresford and Stajano first proposed the concept of mix zone (27) for trajectory perturba-
tion. Specifically, the network domain is partitioned into application zones and mix zones.
Each application zone is a region registered by an LBS, and a user can report her location to
the LBS provider whenever she steps into the region. On the other hand, a mix zone is a region
not registered by any LBS, and a mobile user does not report its location when she is inside
a mixed zone. When there are multiple nodes inside the same mix zone, they exchange their
pseudonyms. After exiting the mix zone, these nodes start to use new pseudonyms in location
updates, making it hard for an adversary to link incoming and outgoing paths of these nodes.
The above approach is restricted in many applications because it relies on pre-defined spa-
tial regions for pseudonym exchange, and users do not report their locations in mix zones. Hoh
and Gruteser (28) proposed another approach through path confusion. A trusted anonymizer is
employed to track the movement of mobile users. When it finds some users’ paths are within
some threshold, it switches their pseudonyms. In addition, it replaces users’ original loca-
tions with perturbed location samples such that the adversary (applying MTT algorithms) will
confuse the tracks and follows the wrong users. Specifically, the proposed technique formal-
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izes the perturbation using an entropy-based model, and uses this model to generate perturbed
location samples in order to maximize the chance of confusion.
Despite their difference, these approaches reduce, but cannot prevent, location privacy
risks. A partial trace, or just a single location sample, can be sufficient for an adversary to
identify a user, thus knowing her whereabouts.
2.5 Trajectory anonymization
Anonymizing the trajectories of a given set of moving objects has been investigated re-
cently. In (29), it is shown that even if the users’ identities are removed in a trajectory database,
the adversary can still assemble a user’s trajectory according to his partial knowledge, i.e., a
portion of location samples in the trajectory. The proposed anonymization technique sup-
presses location information in the original trajectory database wherever privacy leaks occur
and converts it to a secure published database. It shows that finding the optimum set of location
samples to suppress is NP-hard, and a greedy algorithm is proposed to ensure that the adver-
sary cannot correctly infer the owner of any unknown location sample with certain probability
threshold, while maximizing the similarity of the original trajectories to their corresponding
transformations.
In (30) Abul et al exploits the impact of position uncertainty on the trajectory anonymiza-
tion. Due to the imprecision of moving objects’ whereabouts (e.g., caused by GPS error),
the trajectory of a moving object is no longer a polyline, instead it is a cylindrical volume,
where its radius δ represents the possible location imprecision. The main contribution of this
paper is the introduction of the concept (K, δ)-anonymity, which anonymizes a trajectory by
having at least K moving objects appearing within the cylindrical volume of radius δ of every
moving object in the same period of time. To ensure (K, δ)-anonymity a clustering algorithm
is proposed based on space translation. The paper first proves that the problem of achieving
(k, δ)-anonymity by space translation with minimum distortion is NP-hard, and then proposes
13
a greedy algorithm which represents the best trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency.
The work in (31) shares a similar idea of (30), but addresses the impact of trajectory
anonymization on applications which rely on the published location data. The anonymized
trajectories are 3D cylindrical volumes, but most data mining and statistical applications work
on atomic trajectories which consist of location samples with accurate coordinates. To address
this issue, a location reconstruction technique is applied, which regeneralizes users’ locations
by randomly sampling from the cloaking boxes in a trajectory. The experiment results show
that although the reconstructed locations are different from the originated ones reported by
users, they only produces slight effect on the performance of data mining applications.
Fung et al study the privacy threats caused by publishing RFID data in (32). It is shown that
even if names and social security numbers has been removed from the published RFID data,
an adversary may identify a target victim’s record or infer her sensitive value by matching
a priori known visited locations and timestamps. Since RFID data is high-dimensional and
sparse, the challenge of anonymizing RFID moving objects data lies on how to improve the
cloaking resolution. The proposed LKC-privacy model ensures that every RFID moving path
with length not greater thanL is shared by at leastK−1 other moving paths and the confidence
of inferring any pre-specified sensitive values is not greater than C.
In all the above trajectory anonymization schemes, each disclosed trajectory is traversed
by a set of users at the same time. As such, they share the same problem as the techniques
developed for anonymous uses of LBS.
2.6 Privacy-aware opportunistic sensing and monitoring
Opportunistic sensing and monitoring systems (e.g., (33; 34; 35)) have been proposed to
leverage users’ mobile devices to measure environmental context. In these systems, appli-
cations can task mobile nodes in a target region to report context information (e.g., traffic
conditions, pollution reading) from their vicinity. However, the location information revealed
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in the report can put the privacy of users at risk. In (36), Kapadia et al present a privacy-
aware opportunistic sensing system called AnonySense, which features a two-layer protection
of users’ privacy. In the first layer, the proposed technique partitions the network domain
into many tiles, each being a region that K users typically visit within a short time interval,
and lets each node report its location at a granularity of tiles. In the second layer, reports are
aggregated to ensure that several reports are combined before sending context information to
applications. As a result, this system allows applications to deliver tasks to anonymous nodes
and eventually collect reports from anonymous nodes. It is unclear, though, how mobile nodes
are updated with the latest tessellation information. The proposed system also assumes that
each report is an independent event. It does not protect privacy when a user’s location updates
form a trajectory.
In parallel to the above work, Hoh et al address the location privacy risk in traffic moni-
toring system (37), trying to shorten the time period that the adversary can successfully track
a probe vehicle. To achieve this goal, they proposed a system based on Virtual Trip Lines
(VTLs). A VTL is a geographic marker that indicates where a vehicle needs to make a traffic
report (with its location). For privacy protection, these markers are placed to avoid particularly
sensitive areas. Their distances are also made large enough to prevent a user’s consecutive lo-
cation updates from being re-linked as a trajectory. In addition, a distributed temporal cloaking
scheme was proposed which reduces timestamp accuracy to guarantee K-anonymity protec-
tion. Specifically, it replaces a VTL timestamp with a time window during which at least
K updates were generated from the same VTL. However, this approach cannot be used for
location privacy protection in LBS because the placement of VTLs is pre-determined.
2.7 Anonymous routing in ad hoc networks
An ad hoc network consists of a set of nodes, either stationary or mobile, which com-
municate with each other through packet relaying. Because of low cost and easy setup, such
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networks are often deployed in hostile environments such as enemy terrain where no commu-
nication infrastructures exist. In addition, many applications developed in ad hoc networks
are security sensitive, such as military battlefield operations, homeland security scenarios, and
rescue missions. As a result, security issues in ad hoc routing have drawn intensive attention
recently.
Traffic analysis is one of the most serious security attacks against ad hoc routing. By
tracing the network routes and the en-route nodes, the adversary can infer sensitive information
about the applications and the communicating parties, such as nodes’ identities, locations and
moving patterns. To thwart the above threat, a number of anonymous routing protocols have
been developed in literature. In this section we review them in different categories.
Protecting traffic pattern in ad hoc routing: The adversary in some ad hoc network has
global observation of the network traffic and wants to identify the routing paths of data packets.
Knowing traffic pattern of communications the adversary can deduce sensitive information
such as military actions. To address this threat, Jiang et al in (38) proposed Dynamic Mix
Method (DMM) which is extended from the traditional Chaum’s mix method (39) used to hide
sender and receiver of email. They assume that there are a number of mix nodes distributed
over the whole network. When a node has a packet pending, it searches for the mix node
to forward the packet by executing a mix discovery protocol called Optimal Mix (OM). This
protocol is similar to Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) (40), and it constructs a routes between
source and destination with a set of mix nodes in between. Since each mix node re-encrypts
the packets it forwards, the routes are untraceable for the adversary.
Kong et al in (41) proposed an anonymous on-demand routing protocol called ANODR
which does not rely on the predetermined mix nodes in the network. For route discovery, an
Onion-based (42) routing algorithm is proposed to construct an anonymous route between the
source and destination. During data delivery, each hop en route is associated with a random
route pseudonym. As a result, the data packets on different routing paths are mixed at each
forwarding node so that it is hard for the adversary to find out where a packet flow comes from
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and where it goes to.
Different from the above two papers, the work in (43) address the anonymous routing in
MAC-layer communications. It considers the case that there co-exist multiple groups of nodes
in the network. Nodes within a same group communicate with each other and they do not want
to be identified by nodes of other groups. Thus, the challenge is how to construct communica-
tion links between group members without revealing their identities. The proposed technique
employs a trusted authority who assigns each node a sufficiently large set of collision-resistant
pseudonyms. These pseudonyms are chosen to substitute real ID in communications in order
to prevent adversary from tracking. In addition, a pairing-based secret handshake scheme is
used to anonymously authenticate two nodes in the same group and establish the correspond-
ing communication link.
Protecting source location in ad hoc routing: Another track of research (44; 45; 46)
considers the sensor networks that are deployed for detecting and monitoring valuable sources.
The sensors around a source continuously send reports to the sink, while an adversary can
trace the data flow hop by hop backward to discover the source. In (44; 45), Ozturk et al
show that a simple strategy to address this issue is to let some fake sources generate messages
at the same time in order to confuse the adversary. However, it consumes too much energy
and is not suitable for sensor networks. On the other hand, they introduce phantom flooding
which attempts to direct messages from a source to different locations of the network so that
the adversary cannot receive a steady stream of messages to track the source. Specifically, a
message is first unicasted in a random fashion (referred to as random walk) within the first h
hops, and then the message is flooded to the sink. Thus, each message traverses a different
path to the sink.
The work in (46) addresses that the scheme based on random walk in the above two papers
can prevent adversary from tracing back to the source, but the generated routing path may
be much longer than the shortest path to the sink, which leads to undesirable delivery time.
To cope with this problem, this paper proposes the cyclic entrapment method (CEM). In this
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approach, several loops are generated after the deployment of the sensor network and before
sources send any messages to the base station. When a message is being routed along a
path from the source to the sink and it encounters one of these pre-configured loops, the
encountered loop will be activated and will begin cycling fake messages around the loop.
Therefore, when an adversary arrives at this spot, he cannot distinguish the real message and
fake messages, and then becomes unable to track back further.
Protecting nodes’ location in position-based routing: In general, the techniques in
the above two categories consider topology-based routing, and they assume the adversary
locates nodes based on their signal strength (e.g., using triangulation (47; 48; 49)). In contrast,
the work in (50; 51) focuses on position-based routing, and it assumes the adversary can
compromise some node and thus access the location information of nodes that they disclose in
routing protocols. Since location information is the driving factor in position-based routing, it
is more challenging to prevent the adversary from deriving nodes’ sensitive information from
their locations.
The work in (50) aims to unlink the nodes’ identities to their locations during geographic
routing. An anonymous greedy forwarding (AGFW) technique is proposed to achieve this
goal. In this approach, each node maintains an anonymous neighbor table, where the neigh-
bors’ identities are not known but pseudonyms are used instead. During data delivery, the
packet header includes a trapdoor field which can only be opened by the destination. When a
node receives a packet, it can determine if it is the destination using the trapdoor. Otherwise,
it forwards the packet to its neighbor closest to the destination.
AGFW unlinks a node’s identity to its locations using pseudonyms. However, similar to
the traditional geographic routing protocols (e.g. GPSR (3)), it requires each node periodically
broadcast its accurate position to its neighbors. In (51), Wu et al argue that such periodical
heart-beat makes a node highly traceable and it’s much easier to obtain a node’s ID based on
its trajectory. To address this issue, they propose an anonymous geographic routing protocol
called AO2P, which does not require the time-based position report. During packet forwarding,
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only the destination’s position is open, and a contention-based scheme is used to choose the
next hop. Specifically, once a previous hop sends out a packet, its neighbors compute their
distance to the destination, and the ones closer to the destination have a higher probability
to win the contention and become the forwarder. This approach can suppress the location
information revealed in routing, meanwhile it can generate routes with small number of hops.
Despite their differences, anonymous routing techniques aim to prevent an adversary from
identifying important nodes in the network. They do not deal with the safety threat imposed by
the exposure of nodes’ location information.
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CHAPTER 3. Location privacy protection in LBSs
In this chapter, we present our research that investigates location privacy protection in
the context of location-based services. As we discussed in Chapter 1, location information
exposed in service requests presents users significant privacy threats. To address this issue, our
research objective is to prevent a user’s location information, either a single location sample
or a time-series sequence of them, from being correlated with restricted spaces to derive who’s
where at what time. Towards this goal, we make following contributions.
1) We propose using historical location samples, each called a footprint, for location de-
personalization. A location or a trajectory withK different footprints means it has been visited
by K different people. Even if an adversary manages to identify all these people, he will not
know who was there at the time of the service request, thus preserving the user’s location
privacy. 2) We address the challenge of modeling location privacy requirement. With the tra-
ditional K-anonymity model, a user needs to specify a value of K to request a desired level
of privacy protection. This is problematic, because privacy is about feeling, and it is difficult
to scale one’s feeling using a number. Our solution circumvents this problem by allowing a
user to identify a spatial region, such as a shopping mall, which she would feel comfortable
that it is reported as her location should she request a service inside it. This region is then
used as her privacy requirement – each location disclosed on her behalf needs to be at least
as popular as that region. Compared to choosing a number of K, this feeling-based strategy
provides a much more intuitive way for users to express their privacy requirement. 3) With the
above ideas in place, we present a suite of algorithms for efficient location cloaking. These
techniques allow users to entertain LBSs, either sporadic or continuous, while providing them
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a desired level of location privacy protection. We evaluate the performance of our techniques
via simulation under various conditions using location data synthetically generated based on
real road maps. For feasibility and practicality evaluation, we have also implemented an ex-
perimental prototype that supports location privacy aware uses of LBSs.
3.1 Feeling-based privacy modeling
Our research aims at preventing location information disclosed for LBS requests from
being used to derive who’s where at what time. More specifically, given a cloaking box b
reported at time t for an LBS, we want to prevent an adversary from identifying who was in
b at time t by correlating b with restricted spaces such as home and office, which are public-
accessible information. Unlike existing work aimed at supporting anonymous service uses, we
do not consider observation attack. When a user is under direct observation, she does not have
location privacy anyway. As mentioned early, ensuring each cloaking box contains a number
of current users can protect users’ anonymity in service uses, but not their location privacy. To
circumvent this problem, our idea is to leverage historical location samples for cloaking. Given
a cloaking box that has been visited by a number of people, even if an adversary manages to
identify all these people, he will not know who was in the box at the time of service request.
To customize the level of privacy protection, a user can specify a value ofK: each cloaking
box disclosed on her behalf must have at least K different visitors. A larger value of K makes
it harder to link the box to some specific user, thus meaning a higher level of protection. While
this traditional K-anonymity model (52; 53) is simple to implement, choosing an appropriate
K value can be difficult. Why would a user feel that her privacy is well-protected if K = 20,
but not if K = 19? Ultimately, privacy is about feeling, and it is awkward for one to scale
her feeling using a number. A user can always choose a large K to ensure a sufficient privacy
protection, but this will result in unnecessary reduction of location resolution. A very coarse
location will make it difficult to provide a meaningful LBS. In addition to this inherent K-
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anonymity problem, another issue has to do with the robustness in protection. Ensuring each
location has been visited by at least K different users may not provide privacy protection at the
level of K. Indeed, it can achieve so only when these K users have an equal chance of visiting
the region, i.e., they leave the same amount of footprints in the area. In reality, a spatial region
may be visited by many people, but some may have a dominant presence. For example, if an
LBS is requested from an office, then the office staff is more likely to be the service requestor,
even if the office has many visitors.
Instead of a K value, a user can specify a spatial region, which we will refer to as a public
region, and request that the location disclosed on her behalf be at least as popular as that region.
For example, a user may choose a shopping mall in town as her public region. As compared to
choosing a number, choosing a public region provides a much more intuitive way for a user to
express her privacy requirement. We refer to this approach as feeling-based privacy modeling.
The challenge now is how to measure the popularity of a spatial region. As mentioned above,
simply using the number of visitors for popularity measurement is not sufficient, because
the presence of these visitors in the space may not be uniformed. To address this problem,
we borrow the concept of entropy from Shannon’s information theory (54). Suppose we can
collect location samples from cellular phone users. These location samples, each called a
footprint, can then be used to measure the popularity of a spatial region as follows.
Definition 1. Let R be a spatial region and S(R) = {u1, u2, · · · , um} be the set of users who
have footprints inR. Let ni (1 ≤ i ≤ m) be the number of footprints that user ui has inR, and
N =
∑m
i=1 ni. We define the entropy of R as E(R) = −
∑m
i=1
ni
N
log ni
N
, and the popularity of
R as P (R) = 2E(R).
The value of E(R) can be interpreted as the amount of additional information needed for
the adversary to identify the service user from S(R) when R is reported as her location in
requesting an LBS. According to the above definition, we have 1 < P (R) ≤ m. P (R) has the
maximum value m when every user in S(R) has the same number of footprints in R. On the
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other hand, P (R) has the minimum value when one user in S(R) has N −m+1 footprints in
R while each of the rest has only 1. We have the following two observations. First, P (R) is
higher if m is larger. In other words, a region is more popular if it has more visitors. Second,
P (R) has a lower value if the distribution of footprints is more skewed. If some users are
dominant in the region, P (R) will be much less than m. In this case, R needs to be enlarged
to contain more users in order to have a required popularity.
Let R be a user’s public region. When the user requests a sporadic LBS, where the request
can be seen as an independent event, we can find a cloaking box that 1) contains the user’s
current position, 2) has a popularity that is no less than P (R), and 3) is as small as possible,
and then report this box as the user’s location. When the user requests a continuous LBS, a
time-series sequence of cloaking boxes will be reported that form a trajectory. In this case,
simply ensuring that each cloaking box has a popularity no less than P (R) does not protect
the user’s location privacy at her desired level. This is due to the fact that the adversary can
narrow down the list of possible service users by finding the common visitors of these cloaking
boxes. To prevent such attack, we must use the footprints of the common set of users, instead
of all visitors of the regions, in computing the popularity of each cloaking box. We define the
popularity of a spatial region with respect to a given set of users as follows.
Definition 2. Given a spatial region R, and a user set U = {u1, u2, · · · , um′} ⊆ S(R), the
entropy of R with respect to U is EU(R) = −
∑m′
i=1
ni
N ′
log ni
N ′
, where ni is the number of
footprints that ui has in R, and N ′ =
∑m′
i=1 ni. The popularity of R with respect to U is
PU(R) = 2
EU (R)
.
When a sequence of cloaking boxes are generated on a user’s behalf, we must ensure that
the popularity of each cloaking box with respect to the common set of visitors is no less than
that of the user’s public region. In other words, the trajectory formed by these cloaking boxes
must be a P-Popular Trajectory (PPT), which is formally defined below:
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Definition 3. Let T = {R1, R2, · · · , Rn} be a sequence of cloaking boxes generated for a
user, and S(Ri) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) the set of people who have footprints in Ri. We say T is the
user’s PPT if for each Ri, it satisfies that 1) Ri covers the user’s position at the time when
Ri is disclosed, and 2) PS(Ri) ≥ P (R), where S =
⋂
1≤i≤n S(Ri) and R is the public region
specified by the user.
Given a trajectory T = {R1, R2, · · · , Rn}, we define its resolution to be |T | =
∑n
i=1Area(Ri)
n
,
where Area(Ri) denotes the area of box Ri. For location privacy protection, a trajectory
formed by the location samples disclosed on a user’s behalf must be a PPT. Meanwhile, its
resolution needs to be as fine as possible to guarantee the quality of the required LBS services.
3.2 Location cloaking techniques
With the feeling-based privacy model in place, we present our location cloaking tech-
niques for location privacy protection in this section. We first give an overview of the system
architecture and database indexing. Then, we present a suite of cloaking algorithms to sup-
port location privacy protection in both sporadic LBSs and continuous LBSs. For the latter,
we discuss trajectory cloaking under two scenarios: 1) In-advance cloaking when the client’s
moving trajectory is predetermined before the service session begins; 2) On-the-fly cloaking
when the moving trajectory is unknown beforehand.
3.2.1 System overview
Similar to existing work (e.g., (9), (10), (14)), we assume mobile clients communicate with
LBS providers through a trusted central location depersonalization server (LDS) managed by
the clients’ cellular service carriers, as shown in Figure 3.1. For LBSs that require user au-
thentication (e.g., for service charges), we assume anonymous authentication (e.g., (55), (56),
(57)) is used. The carriers offer the depersonalization services as a value-added feature to their
clients, and supply the LDS with an initial footprint database that contains location samples
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collected from their clients (e.g., through regular phone calls). These location samples will be
used to compute the popularity of a spatial region and for trajectory cloaking. Hereafter, we
will use terms location sample and footprint interchangeably. The footprint database will be
expanded with the location data obtained from mobile users in their requests of LBSs.
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Request
Answer Answer
Cloaked region 
& Request
Base 
Station
Location 
Depersonalization 
Server
LBS Server
Trusted cellular infrastructures
Internet ::
::
Users
Com3
Com3
::
::
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Untrusted facilities
Figure 3.1 System architecture
We assume the adversaries have access to anonymous location data collected by LBSs and
are interested in finding who was where at what time by correlating such information with
restricted spaces such as office and home addresses. For LBSs, which may involve a large
number of users and have a global coverage, such restricted space identification is probably
the most realistic and economic way for location privacy intrusion. Unlike service anonymity
protection, we do not consider observation attack (9). If an adversary has direct observation
over the region where a user locates, the user does not have location privacy anyway.
Our research considers location cloaking for both sporadic LBSs and continuous LBSs. In
the former, each location update of a user is independent to others. The LDS needs to cloak
it with a region no less popular than the user specified public region. In the latter, location
updates of a user in a service are correlated and they form a trajectory. The LDS needs to
cloak it with a PPT defined in Section 3.1. To facilitate the cloaking process, we use the
following structure of manage the historical location data.
We partition the network domain recursively into cells in a quad-tree style. The partition-
ing stops when the size of cells becomes less than a threshold (our implementation sets each
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cell to be at least 100×100meter2). All the cells generated in the partitioning form a pyramid
structure as shown in Figure 3.2. Suppose the partitioning stops at the hth recursion, then the
pyramid has a height of h. The top level in the pyramid is level 1 and has only one grid cell
that covers the whole network domain. Each grid cell except the ones at the bottom level is
composed of four cells at the next lower level, which we refer to as its child cells.
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level h
uid pos
uid num
Footprint table
Cell table
tlink
Trajectories
Figure 3.2 Data structure
Each cell at the bottom level h keeps a footprint table and a user table. The footprint table
stores the footprints the cell contains, and each tuple of the table is a record of (uid, pos, tlink),
where uid is the identity of the mobile user that a footprint belongs to, pos is the coordinates
of a footprint, and tlink is a pointer that links to the corresponding trajectory stored in the
database. The user table records the number of footprints a user has in the cell, and each tuple
of the table is a record of (uid, num), where num is the number of footprints the user has in
the cell. For each cell not at the bottom level, we also keeps a user table, which is derived
from the user tables corresponding to its four child cells.
3.2.2 Single location sample cloaking
For instant LBSs, a mobile client configures her privacy requirement by specifying a public
region R, and report it with its location p to the LDS. In response, the LDS calculates the
popularity of the public region P (R), and computes a cloaking box which contains c and has
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a popularity no less than P (R). For the sake of service quality, the size of the cloaking box
should be as small as possible. Cloaking footprints is different from cloaking neighboring
users since different footprints may belong to the same user. A cloaking box containing K
footprints may not have a popularity of K. Thus, existing cloaking techniques using current
neighbors cannot be directly applied for cloaking footprints. In this section, we present a
heuristic algorithm to the cloaking box with a resolution as fine as possible. The pseudo code
is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Cloak(p, P (R))
1: {Phase I: compute searching box}
2: b′ ← the cell that contains p
3: while P (b′) < P (R) do
4: {get cells at bottom level adjacent to b′}
5: E ← Adjacent(b′, h)
6: {merging the cells in E with b′}
7: b′ ← b′ ⋃E
8: update user table of b′
9: end while
10: {Phase II: compute cloaking box}
11: k = ⌈P (R)⌉
12: F ← k closest footprints belonging to different users
13: U ← corresponding users of footprints in F
14: b← MBB of footprints in F
15: while P (b) < P (R) and U 6= S(b′) do
16: k′ = ⌈P (R)− P (b)⌉
17: for i = 1 to k′ do
18: f ← the footprint closest to p not belonging to U
19: F ← F ⋃{f}
20: U ← U ⋃ {user corresponding to f}
21: end for
22: b← MBB of footprints in F
23: end while
24: if U = S(b′) and P (b) < P (R) then
25: b← MBB of all footprints in b′
26: end if
27: return b
The cloaking algorithm consists of two phases: (I) the LDS finds a searching box b′ with
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a popularity no less than P (R) according to the user tables of the cells in the bottom level;
(II) using the footprints in the searching box b′, the LDS computes the cloaking box b which
has a popularity no less than P (R) and has an area as small as possible. In phase I (line 1-9),
the LDS first sets the searching box b′ as the cell at the bottom level of the pyramid which
contains the client’s position p, and computes its popularity P (b′) according to its user table.
If P (b′) < P (R), which means b′ is not popular enough, the LDS expands the searching box b′
by merging it with its adjacent cells at the bottom level, and updates its user table by computing
the union of the user tables of the cells in b′. The searching box is expanded repeatedly until
its popularity is no less than P (R) (line 3-9).
In phase II (line 10-27), the LDS first finds k = ⌈P (R)⌉ closest footprints to p each
belonging to a different user, and records the footprint set as F and the corresponding user set
as U . Then the LDS computes the minimum bounding box (MBB) b of the k footprints and
compute its popularity. If P (b) < P (R), the LDS finds k′ = ⌈P (R)−P (b)⌉ closest footprints
to p each belonging to a different user who is not in U , and updates F and U by adding these
footprints and corresponding users. Next, the LDS recalculates b as the MBB of the footprints
in F and the above process is run repeatedly until P (b) ≥ P (R), or U = S(b′) which means
all people visited b′ have been counted (line 15-23). If U = S(b′) but P (b) < P (R), the LDS
computes the cloaking box b as the MBB of all footprints in b′.
3.2.3 In-advance trajectory cloaking
In a continuous LBS, a mobile client makes a time series sequence of location updates
which form a trajectory. In response, the LDS needs to generate a cloaking box for each
location update, and make sure these cloaking boxes together form a P-Popular Trajectory
(PPT). Comparing with single location cloaking, trajectory cloaking is more challenging. As
mentioned in Section 3.1, simply having each cloaking box as popular as the public region
cannot ensure the protection of the client’s location privacy. Instead, the LDS has to make
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each cloaking box popular enough with respect to a common set of user. In the rest of this
section, we focus on how to address this challenge in trajectory cloaking. We first discuss
in-advance cloaking scenario, in which the service user knows her moving route beforehand.
As the moving route is predetermined, when the service user submits the service request,
she also reports a base trajectory T0 = {p1, p2, · · · , pn} to the LDS, in which pi is a location
sample on her route where she will update her location. In response, the LDS computes a PPT
T = {b1, b2, · · · , bn}, where bi is a cloaking box containing pi. During the service session,
when the client arrives pi, bi will be reported to the LBS provider in requesting service. In this
subsection, we present a trajectory cloaking algorithm that generates a PPT with resolution as
fine as possible.
According to its definition, to generate a PPT, the LDS has to find a common set of users,
which we refer to as cloaking set, and use their footprints to compute cloaking boxes in the
PPT. It may first appear that the LDS can determine the cloaking set, denoted as S, by finding
the set of users who have footprints closest to the starting point of the service user. This simple
solution minimizes the size of the first cloaking box. However, as the service user moves, the
users in S may not have footprints that are close to her current position. As a result, the size of
the cloaking boxes may become larger and larger, making it difficult to guarantee the quality
of LBS. To address this challenge, our idea is to find those users who have footprint close to
all the location samples in the base trajectory T0 and use them to create the cloaking set. Based
on this idea, we develop the following approach to compute the cloaking set. The pseudo code
is given in Algorithm 2. The LDS first finds out all cells at the bottom level of the pyramid
that overlap with T0’s location samples. These cells, denoted as b′i(1 ≤ i ≤ n), are marked
as searching boxes (line 2-4). According to the cells’ user tables, the LDS then retrieves the
users, say U , that have visited all of these searching boxes, and compute their popularity with
respect to U . Among all the searching boxes, if there exists at least one whose popularity
with respect to U is less than P (R), the LDS expands the searching scope by merging each
searching box and its adjacent cells together as a new searching box. Then, according to the
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user tables of the searching boxes, the LDS recalculates the user set U who have visited all
of them. This process is repeated until all searching boxes’ popularity with respect to U is no
less than P (R) (line 6-15). Then, U is selected as the cloaking set.
Algorithm 2 Select-In-Advance(T0, P (R))
1: {Base trajectory T0 = {p1, p2, · · · , pn}}
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: b′i ← cell that contains pi
4: end for
5: U ← ⋂1≤i≤n S(b′i)
6: while ∃i ∈ [1, n]|PU(b′i) < P (R) do
7: for i = 1 to n do
8: {get cells at bottom level adjacent to b′i}
9: Ei ← Adjacent(b′i, h)
10: {merging the cells in Ei with b′i}
11: b′i ← b′i
⋃
Ei
12: update user table of b′i
13: end for
14: U ← ⋂1≤i≤n S(b′i)
15: end while
16: return U
After choosing the cloaking set, the LDS generates a PPT by computing a cloaking box for
each location sample in T0 using the footprints of users in U . Given a location pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
the LDS can simply call the function in Algorithm 1 to compute the cloaking box. The only
difference is that the LDS counts only footprints of users in U .
3.2.4 On-the-fly trajectory cloaking
In this subsection we discuss on-the-fly cloaking scenario, in which the service user does
not know her moving route beforehand. When the service user requests an LBS, she also
informs the LDS a travel bound B, a rectangular spatial region that bounds her travel during
the service session. In response, the LDS randomly generates a service session ID and contacts
the service provider. After establishing a service session, the service user periodically reports
her current location to the LDS. For each location update, the LDS computes a cloaking box
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which contains the service user’s current location, and exports this box along with the session
ID to the corresponding LBS provider. The LDS must ensure that the trajectory created by the
sequence of cloaking boxes is a PPT that satisfies the user’s privacy requirement.
Similar to in-advance cloaking, the LDS has to find a cloaking set in order to generate the
PPT. But on-the-fly cloaking is more difficult. The challenge is that the service user’s route
is not predetermined, and thus the LDS cannot figure out whose footprints will be closer to
the service user during her travel. Therefore, it is hard to find a PPT with a fine resolution.
To address this challenge, our idea is to find those users who have visited most places in the
service user’s travel bound B and use them to create the cloaking set. As these users have
footprints spanning the entire region B, it will help generate a PPT with a fine resolution.
Recall that in Section 3.2.1 we present a pyramid structure which manages all historical
location data in the network domain. Here we say a user is l-popular within B, if she has
footprints in every cell at level l that overlaps with B. According to the pyramid structure,
cells at level with a larger l have a finer granularity. This implies that given an l-popular user,
the larger the value of l is, the more popular the user is. Figure 3.3 shows an example in
which a network domain is partitioned into a 4-level pyramid (There are 1, 4, 16, 64 cells at
each level respectively from top to bottom). It also shows a travel bound B and the footprints
inside it. The footprints in different colors belong to different users. u1, u2, and u3 are three
2-popular users withinB because they have footprints in the two cells at level 2 of the pyramid
which overlap with B; u2, u3 are two 3-popular users within B since they have footprints in
all four cells at level 3 that overlap with B; only u3 is 4-popular since she is the only one who
has footprints in all the sixteen cells at level 4 that overlap with B.
Based on the above definitions, we now present a simple and effective algorithm that can
find an appropriate cloaking set which can assist generating a PPT with fine resolution. The
pseudo code is given in Algorithm 3. In this algorithm, the LDS sorts the users in S(B)
according to their popularity at level l, and selects the most popular users in S(B) as the
cloaking set, starting from the bottom to top of the pyramid. Let Cl denote the set of cells at
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Figure 3.3 A travel bound and footprints inside
level l in the pyramid, C ′l the set of cells in Cl that overlap with B, and Sl the set of users who
are l-popular within B. The LDS first finds Sh. Since level h is the bottom level, these users
are the most popular users in S(B). To find Sh (i.e., the users who have visited all the cells
in C ′h), the LDS simply joins the user tables of these cells on column uid (line 6-7). Next,
the LDS computes the popularity of B with respect to Sh using their footprints in B. If the
popularity PSh(B) is less than P (R), it means that cloaking with the footprints of the users
in Sh cannot provide the desired level of privacy protection for the service user. In this case,
the LDS considers the cells one level higher, i.e., level h− 1 (line 9), and computes Sh−1 and
PSh−1(B) similarly. This procedure is repeated until at some level l the popularity PSl(B) is
no less than P (R) (line 3-10).
The above algorithm goes over the pyramid level by level from bottom to top. If a user is
l-popular within B, it must also be (l − 1)-popular within B. Thus, each time the algorithm
checks the cells at a higher level, the cloaking set is expanded to include more users. As long
as P (R) ≤ P (B) (i.e., a user’s public region is at most the same popular as that of her travel
bound), the algorithm will find a sufficient number of visitors within B for the cloaking set.
In the worst case, all users in S(B) are included in the cloaking set. On the other hand, if
P (B) < P (R), the LDS does not need to find a cloaking set. It can simply compute a spatial
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Algorithm 3 Select-On-The-Fly(B, P (R))
1: U ← ∅{U keeps the cloaking set}
2: l ← h
3: while U ⊂ S(B) and PU(B) < P (R) do
4: {Get cells at level l overlapping with B}
5: C ′l ← Overlap(Cl, B)
6: {Join user tables of C ′l by column uid}
7: T ← Join(C ′l , uid)
8: U ← Sl ← T.uid
9: l ← l − 1
10: end while
11: return U
region that contains B and has a popularity no less than P (R), and always report this region
as the user’s location as long as it moves inside B.
Similar to in-advance cloaking, during the service session, the LDS will generate a PPT by
computing a cloaking box for each location update from the service user using the footprints
of users in the cloaking set U . Given a location p, the LDS can simply call the function in
Algorithm 1 to compute the cloaking box. The differences lie on two points. First, the LDS
only counts footprints of users in U . Second, when expanding the searching box (Algorithm
1 line 4-7), only the adjacent cells in B are merged.
3.3 Simulations
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed technique under various con-
ditions using location data synthetically generated based on a real road map. We modify the
simulator Network-based Generator of Moving Objects (58) to generate mobile nodes and
simulate their movement on the real road map of Oldenburg, Germany, a city about 15 × 15
km2. The GUI of the simulator is shown in Figure 3.4. We extract four types of roads from
the road map, primary road (interstate expressway), secondary road (state road), connecting
road and neighborhood road as defined in census TIGER/Line (59). In our simulation, mobile
nodes change their speeds at each intersection, and the moving speed on a road follows a nor-
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mal distribution determined by the road type. The mean speeds and the standard deviations
of moving speeds on all road types are listed in Table 3.1. We generate a footprint database
that contains a certain number of trajectories, which are assigned to 2000 users. The num-
ber of trajectories each user has follows a normal distribution with a standard deviation 0.1.
These trajectories are indexed using the grid-based approach discussed in the Section 3.2.1.
We evaluate the performance of our techniques for both single location cloaking and trajectory
cloaking, which we will present in the rest of this section respectively.
Figure 3.4 Generator of moving objects
34
Table 3.1 Traffic parameters
Road type Mean speed Standard deviation
Primary 100km/h 20km/h
Secondary 60km/h 15km/h
Connecting 45km/h 10km/h
Neighborhood 30km/h 5km/h
3.3.1 Single location sample cloaking
In this study, we investigate the performance of single location cloaking algorithm. For
each simulation, we generate 300 service requests. Every service request contains the service
user’s position which is randomly selected from the location samples in the database, and a
public region which is a square region that contains the position. For each request, a cloak-
ing box is computed using Algorithm 1, and exposed as the service user’s location. We are
interested in two performance metrics. One is cloaking area, defined to be the average area
of cloaking boxes generated for the set of request in a simulation. The other one is privacy
level, defined to be the average popularity of the cloaking boxes. We varied the size of a public
region, measured by the side length of the square region, from 50 to 250 meters, and plotted
the performance results in Figure 3.5. Figure 3.5 (a) shows that when the size of the public
region increases, the average cloaking area increases. This is due to the fact that a larger pub-
lic region is likely to contain more people’s footprints and have a higher popularity. Thus,
a cloaking box needs to be larger to satisfy a higher level of privacy requirement. In Figure
3.5(b), besides the privacy level, we draw another line which indicates the average number of
users who have visited the cloaking box computed for a request. As we can see, both lines
are incremental with respect to the size of public region, but the number of visitors is always
larger than the popularity of the cloaking box. This result shows that the number of visitors of
a region is not a good measure of the privacy level the region can provide for the service user.
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Figure 3.5 Performance of single location cloaking on the effect of privacy re-
quirement
3.3.2 Trajectory cloaking
We evaluate the performance of both in-advance cloaking and on-the-fly cloaking. For
comparison purpose, we have implemented two other approaches. The first one, which we
will refer to as Naive, assumes the location updates made a service user are independent to
each other. For each location update, Naive just applies Algorithm 1 to compute a cloaking
box, and reports it as the service user’s location in her service request. Note that this scheme
may not protect a user’s location privacy at her desired level when she makes a time-series
sequence of location updates. The second approach is referred to as Plain hereafter. This
scheme determines the cloaking set for the service users by finding the footprints closest to
her start position. After fixing the cloaking set, Algorithm 1 is applied to compute the cloaking
boxes for the service user during her entire service session. For each simulation, we generate
a number of service sessions. Every session contains a user specified public region, a travel
bound, and the user’s moving route which is the fastest path between a start and a destination
selected in the travel bound. For in-advance cloaking, we select a location sample every 100
meters along the moving route and these samples form the user’s base trajectory, and the PPT
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is computed according to the base trajectory using Algorithm 2. For on-the-fly cloaking, we
assume the moving routing is un-predetermined, and the PPT is computed according to the
travel bound using Algorithm 3.
In our study, we are mainly interested in the following two performance metrics. One is
cloaking area, defined to be the average area of cloaking boxes in a cloaking trajectory. The
other one is protection level. Given a cloaking trajectory, we measure its protection level using
the ratio between the average popularity of its cloaking boxes with respect to the common set
of users who have visited all of them and the popularity of the user specified public region.
Clearly, the protection level must be at least 1, otherwise the cloaking trajectory fails to protect
the service user’s location privacy at the required level. In the following subsections, we report
how the performance of the techniques is affected by various factors.
Table 3.2 Simulation parameters
parameter range default unit
Users # 2000 2000 unit
Public region size 50 - 250 150 meter
Trajectory # 100K − 300K 200K unit
Travel bound size 2− 6 4 km
Travel distance 2− 6 4 km
Service requests # 300 300 unit
Minimum cell size 100 × 100 100 × 100 meter2
3.3.2.1 Effect of privacy requirement
This study investigates the impact of privacy requirement (i.e., the popularity of the public
region specified by a service user) on the performance of the three techniques. We generated
300 service requests. Each request has a travel bound of a 4 × 4 km2 square region, and the
travel distance of the corresponding user during her service session is 4 km. Each service user
specifies her public region as a square region which contains her start position. The size of
a public region, measured by the side length of the square, is varied from 50 to 250 meters.
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The performance results are plotted in Figure 3.6. Figure 3.6 (a) shows that when the size of
the public region increases, the average cloaking area under all the schemes increases. This
is due to the fact that a larger public region is likely to contain more people’s footprints and
have a higher popularity. To satisfy a higher level of privacy requirement, a cloaking box
needs to be larger to include more people. This study also shows that Plain always has a
much larger cloaking area as compared to the other approaches. This scheme does not take
user popularity into consideration when selecting a user’s cloaking set. When some unpopular
users are selected in a cloaking set, the cloaking boxes generated for the future movement
of a service user will become larger and larger in order to contain all users in the cloaking
set. Moreover, we can see in Figure 3.6 (a) that On-the-fly has larger cloaking area than In-
advance. This is due to the fact that In-advance cloaking selects the cloaking set according to
the predetermined base trajectory, and thus the users in the cloaking set must have footprints
close to the moving route. On the other hand, On-the-fly cloaking selects the cloaking set using
their footprints in the travel bound, and thus it cannot guarantee they have footprints close to
the moving route. Comparing with the other three schemes, Naive has the smallest cloaking
area. This scheme does not consider the correlation of the cloaking boxes in a trajectory, just
cloaking each location with a bounding box that is as small as possible and has a popularity
no less than that of the public region. The problem is, simply ensuring that each cloaking box
satisfies the privacy requirement does not protect a user’s privacy at her specified level. This
is confirmed in Figure 3.6 (b). It shows that the protection level of Naive is constantly lower
than 1. As for the other three schemes, they all guarantee that the actual protection level is no
less than required.
3.3.2.2 Effect of travel distance
In this study, we investigated the impact of travel distance on the performance of the three
techniques. In each simulation run, we set the public region as a 150 × 150 m2 square, and
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Figure 3.6 Effect of privacy requirement
generated 300 service requests. The travel distance is varied from 2 km to 6 km, and accord-
ingly the side length of travel bound is varied from 2 km to 6 km. The performance results
are shown in Figure 3.7 (a) and (b). Figure 3.7 (a) shows that under all schemes except Naive,
the average cloaking area increases as the travel distance increases. However, In-advance per-
forms the best while Plain performs the worst. The reason behind is explained as follows.
When the travel distance is larger, the trajectory of the service user tends to traverse through a
larger region. It is more difficult to find a cloaking set that all the users have footprints close to
every location update in the moving route. Since In-advance cloaking always finds the users
who have footprints closest to the base trajectory, the generated PPTs tend to have a finer
cloaking resolution. As for On-the-fly and Plain, cloaking is not based on the predetermined
base trajectory. In general, the more unpopular users included in the cloaking set, the more
difficult it is to generate a PPT with fine resolution. Plain performs worse because in average
it includes more unpopular users in a cloaking set. On the other hand, the cloaking area under
Naive remains almost constant as the travel distance changes. It is due to the fact that Naive
assumes each location update is an independent event. For each location update, it simply
finds the nearest footprints to cloak. As such, the cloaking area is irrelevant to the number of
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location updates in the trajectory. Again, this approach cannot be used for location privacy
protection when a user has to report her location periodically in a service session. Figure 3.7
(b) shows the protection level of Naive decreases as the travel distance increases. Since each
location update is cloaked independently in Naive, a longer trajectory tends to have a less
number of users who have visited all cloaking boxes in the trajectory, and thus has a lower
popularity with respect to this common set of users. In contrast, the privacy level under none
of the other three schemes is much affected by the variance of travel distance.
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Figure 3.7 Effect of travel distance
3.3.2.3 Effect of footprint database size
This study investigates the impact of the number of trajectories in the footprint database
on the performance. We varied the number of trajectories in the database from 100,000 to
300,000. The performance results are plotted in Figure 3.8 (a) and (b). It is shown in Fig-
ure 3.8 (a) that all schemes have better cloaking results when the database contains more
trajectories. Clearly, more historical trajectories mean that more footprints collected in a fixed
spatial region. As a result, a smaller cloaking box may be populous enough to meet the privacy
requirement. By adding a service user’s moving route to the database for future cloaking, our
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technique can generate better cloaking results. This feature makes it especially attractive for
large-scale LBS that consists of a large number of users. Figure 3.8 (b) again shows that the
protection level of Naive is constantly lower than 1. On the other hand, the protection level
under all the other schemes is always above 1.
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Figure 3.8 Effect of database size
3.4 Experiments
We have implemented an experimental system based on the technique presented in the
previous sections. The prototype, called location privacy aware gateway (LPAG), has two
software components, client and server. Client is implemented in C# using .Net Compact
Framework 1.0. It runs on Windows Mobile 2003 platform and we have tested it with two
types of mobile devices, HP IPAQ 6515 and HP IPAQ 4310 as shown in Figure 3.9. The former
is a smart phone with a built-in 4-channel GPS receiver. The device communicates with the
server through AT&T’s GPRS wireless data service. As long as it is within the region covered
by the carrier’s service network, it can stay connected to the server which is located in our lab.
The other type of client device, namely HP IPAQ 4310, is a regular pocket PC which connects
with the server through our university’s campus wireless network, which limits its roaming
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area to be within our campus. To make it position-aware, we bundle it with an external 16-
channel GPS receiver, which provides position information through bluetooth connection. The
server component is implemented in C# using .Net Framework 1.0. It manages the historical
location data and corresponding indices using MySQL 5.0, and cloaks mobile clients’ location
updates using the proposed techniques when they request LBSs. In a seperate research project,
we have a implemented a location-based service system called ePostit (60). This system allows
one to publish a geo-referenced note, each associated with a geographic region and delieved to
a user when the user arrive at the region. In our experiment, we also plant a number of spatial
messages in our campus and let a user entertain the services provided by ePostit through the
LPAG.
Figure 3.9 Client devices
Our test of LPAG consists of a location sampling phase, during which we collect users’
footprints for location depersonalization. We create a number of client accounts, and carry
the devices and have a walk around the campus, during which the devices makes periodical
location update to the server. After a trajectory is collected, we randomly choose a client from
the accounts created before, assign the trajectory to the client, and save it in the trajectory
database in the server. In our testing of LPAG, we specify a rectangular region in the campus
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as the public region, and have a walk in the campus with a mobile device. During the walk,
we send a sequence of queries to the server, each with our current position. For each query,
the server generates a cloaking box using the proposed technique, and forwards it to ePostit.
In response, the service provider delivers all the messages whose bounding boxes overlap
with the cloaking box to the server, and the server forwards to the client only the ones whose
bounding box contains the client’s current position. In the following subsections, we introduce
our system’s user interfaces and discuss the experimental results collected in our field tests.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.10 Server and client interface
3.4.1 Server and client user interface
Figure 3.10 (a) shows the server interface. Every time the server receives a query from a
client, it computes a cloaking box as the client’s location in requesting the service. Then, the
server displays the cloaking box and the client’s position on the map. As the example shown
in this figure, two clients and their cloaking boxes are displayed on the campus map.
When a mobile device is powered on, the client finds out the current position and then
connects to the server. After initialization, the screen shows a local map as its background
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and marks the client’s position by a small face icon (see Figure 3.10 (b)). At the beginning of
a service session, the client can set the public region by clicking the touch screen to specify
its top-left corner and bottom-right corner, and embed the public region in the query packet.
In the example shown in Figure 3.10 (b), the client specifies the library as her public region
which is marked by the red rectangle. In our experiments, the travel bound is set as the whole
campus. Then, during the session, the client can choose to periodically update her location or
manually update whenever she wants (see Figure 3.10 (c)).
3.4.2 Experimental results
We first examine the system resources used by our code running on mobile devices.
CPU utilization: We measure the CPU utilization of our client code on the smartphone
using Xda pps (61), which allows one to monitor the CPU usage of all the processes running
on a smart device. When the device is idling with no movement, the CPU utilization is about
1%, indicating that reading GPS position (every one second) does not take much computation.
When the client moves around but does not make any location update, we observe that the
CPU utilization is in between 4%−12%, as our code redraws the client’s position on the map.
When the client communicates with the server (e.g., location update, message delivery), the
CPU utilization is in between 10%− 25%.
Memory and storage: Our client executable is only 120KB by itself. Since it is built
on the .NET Compact Framework 1.0 and OPENNETCF 1.4, additional 2.5MB and 580KB
files from the two platforms are needed, respectively. When running, our system has a mem-
ory footprint of 5.1MB, which is less than 10% of available main memory on HP IPAQ6515
(57.78MB) and HP IPAQ4310 (56.77MB). On both devices, our code can run simultaneously
with other applications such as media player and Internet explorer.
We also examine two performance metrics which affect the usability of our system.
GPS accuracy: Because of position deviation of the GPS receiver, the position reported
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to the server may be different from the actual position of a client. If the position deviation
is large, the bounding box computed by the server may not contain the client’s position, and
the client may get the false query result (missing or downloading wrong messages). In our
experiments, we have tested the accuracy of the two types of GPS in the campus area. The
smartphone we use has a built-in 4-channel GPS, while the external GPS bundled with the
pocket PC has 16 channels. To calculate the position, a GPS receiver needs to have signals
from at least 4 satellites. In general, the more channels available, the more accurate position
it can compute. Our tests show that the 16-channel GPS has 5 meters error in average and 8
meters error in maximum. While the 4-channel GPS performs worse. It has 7 meters error
in average and 14 meters error in maximum. These tests indicate that in the worst case the
server should expand the boundary of the cloaking box by 15 meters to ensure the cloaking
box contains the client’s actual position, and the bounding box of a message should not be
smaller than 15m× 15m.
Response time: The interval between the time a client sends a query and the time she
receives the query result consists of four parts: 1) the time it takes to deliver the query from
the client to the server, 2) the time the server uses to compute the cloaking box, 3) the time for
the server to send the cloaking box to the service provider and receive candidate messages from
the service provider, 4) the time it takes to download the resulting messages from the server
to the client. Our experiments show that the server computes the cloaking box usually in less
than 10 ms. In addition, the transmission speed between the server and the service provider is
also very fast (> 4MB/s) since they are connected with a high speed LAN. The bottleneck
is the communication between the client and the server, i.e., part 1) and 4). The smartphone
we use connects to our server via AT&T’s GPRS, while the Pocket PC connects to our server
via our campus’s WLAN. In our test, we create a number of messages, some with simple
text messages (1-5KB) and short audio clips (10-30KB), while the rest with video clips (100-
300KB). Our tests show that for messages with simple text and audio clips, the smartphone and
pocket PC can download them with a delay of less than 1 second and 3 seconds, respectively;
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for the messages with video clips, the pocket PC has a minimal delay of 5 seconds while
the smartphone has a latency of more than 20 seconds. This study indicates that for cellular
phones, our system is more appropriate for light-weight messages. Fortunately, this will not
be a problem with the continuous development of broadband wireless services provided by
the cellular carriers.
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CHAPTER 4. Location safety protection in ad hoc networks
In this chapter, we present our research which investigates location safety protection in ad
hoc networks. As discussed in Chapter 1, the location safety threat is considered particularly
in digital battlefield, where enemy can locate and destroy a network node using its location in-
formation revealed in communications. This threat is different from location privacy intrusion
in the sense that here the adversary is not interested in finding the individual identities of the
nodes in a spatial region, but simply wants to locate and destroy them. In terms of counter-
measure, the two threats actually appear to be opposite to each other. For privacy protection,
we want a subject to be accompanied by as many others as possible. This, however, is coun-
terintuitive from the safety point of view, because the more nodes a spatial region contains,
the more attractive for an adversary to destroy them all together.
Our research goal of location safety protection is to allow nodes to reveal their location
information, yet make it practically infeasible for the adversary to locate them based on such
information. Towards this objective, we make the following contributions. 1) We proposed
to reduce location resolution of nodes’ disclosed location to achieve a desired level of safety
protection. Instead of revealing its accurate position, a node can report that it is inside some
geographic region – cloaking box. 2) We address the challenge of computing a cloaking box
with cost-effective solutions in the context of both stationary and mobile ad hoc networks. 3)
We investigate the impact of location cloaking on the geographic routing protocols, and we
proposes a novel location secure routing (LSR) protocol which is able to deliver data packets
efficiently, as well as prevent adversary from compromising nodes’ location safety according
to the routing information. In the rest of this chapter, we first present our cloaking techniques
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in Section 4.1, and then we present the location secure routing protocol in Section 4.2.
4.1 Location cloaking for location safety protection
We consider an ad hoc network formed by a set of sensor nodes deployed in a hostile
environment, where communications among the nodes may be open to an adversary. The ad-
versary is interested in collecting the location information revealed by the nodes, then locating
and destroying them. This safety threat cannot be fully defeated by the means of message
encryption (50) and anonymous routing (38; 41; 43). Encryption makes a message intelligible
only to its destination, but works only if the intended recipient is trustworthy. Anonymous
routing shares the same problem. By making routes untraceable, it prevents an adversary from
identifying important targets like a command post through the collection and analysis of data
flow and traffic pattern. But it does not thwart the direct threats imposed by the exposure
of nodes’ location information. In reality, a node may be destroyed whenever it is located,
regardless of its importance.
Knowing that a certain region contains a set of sensors, the adversary can always comb
through the whole area to uncover them. However, if the area is very large, the searching cost
can be prohibitively high. In light of this observation, we propose reducing location resolution
to achieve a desired level of safety protection. Instead of revealing its accurate position, a node
can report that it is inside some geographic region, which we will refer to as a cloaking box.
Given a cloaking box, we measure its safety level as the ratio of its area and the number of
nodes inside it. The higher safety level a cloaking box has, the less attractive for the adversary
to search the nodes inside it. When a cloaking box’s safety level exceeds some threshold, it
can be considered safe for release – the adversary would not be able to search because of high
cost.
The challenge is how to compute cloaking boxes. First, each cloaking box must satisfy
the minimal safety level requirement, meanwhile it must be as small as possible in order to
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minimize the impact of reduced location resolution on the efficiency of network operating and
applications. Second, nodes must be able to compute their cloaking boxes without having to
reveal their accurate position. Finally, a sequence of cloaking boxes must not be correlated
to identify an area whose safety level is below the requirement. This is due to the fact that
the adversary may be able to collect many cloaking boxes. It may first appear that a node can
simply broadcast to query its nearby nodes about their location, and then identify the smallest
region that meets the safety requirement as its cloaking box. This strategy, however, requires
nodes to report their exact location, a security breach that should not be allowed in a hostile
environment. In addition, determining the query broadcast region itself is difficult. When the
node queries a region, it actually reveals that it is inside the region. If the region’s safety level
is not sufficient, the nodes inside the region are all in danger.
To address the above challenges, our idea is partitioning the network domain into a number
of safe subdomains that is as small as possible, and let each node take the subdomain where it
resides as its cloaking box. A subdomain is safe if its safety level is no less than the minimal
required level. To make subdomains as small as possible, each subdomain is recursively split
as long as the resulted subdomains are all safe.
Based on the above idea, we have developed a novel cloaking technique for location safety
protection. Next, we will introduce the concept of safety level and the requirement of location
cloaking, followed by our cloaking algorithms for both static and mobile ad hoc networks. As
we will show, our algorithms do not require nodes to reveal their accurate position. In fact,
we guarantee that the safety requirement is satisfied for all location information they disclose.
We also show that even if all cloaking boxes reported by nodes are known to the adversary,
they cannot be correlated to refine an area that violates the safety requirement.
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4.1.1 Safety level
We assume the adversary locates the nodes by collecting and analyzing their location dis-
closed in communications, but not combing through the network domain (e.g., physically
explore the domain and detect communicating nodes within its radio range). To avoid from
being located, nodes reduce the resolution of their location information. Specifically, when-
ever a node has to disclose its location, it reports a cloaking box, a geographic region that
contains its current position. Given a cloaking box b, we define its safety level as S(b) = A(b)
N(b)
,
whereA(b) denotes the area of b, N(b) denotes the population of b, i.e., the number of wireless
nodes inside b.
Reducing location resolution can provide a desired level of safety protection to an ad hoc
network. We say the network is protected at a safety level of θ if during its life time, the
adversary cannot find any region in the network domain whose safety level is less than θ.
Simply ensuring that each cloaking box reported by nodes has a minimal safety level of θ
does not guarantee that the network is protected at θ level, because the adversary may collect
multiple cloaking boxes and correlate them for attack. Consider three cloaking boxes showed
in Figure 4.1. Even if each box has a safety level of θ, when combined, the safety level of their
concatenated region is less than θ.
b1
b2
b3
Figure 4.1 Correlation attack
Let b be a cloaking box to be disclosed by a node at time t, and B = {b1, b2, · · · , bm} be
the set of all cloaking boxes revealed by nodes in the network before time t. To protect the
network’s safety at θ level, the following two conditions must be satisfied:
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1. S(b) ≥ θ;
2. b cannot be combined with any subset of B, say B′ = {b′1, b′2, · · · , b′k} ⊆ B, such that
S(
⋃k
j=1 b
′
j
⋃
b) ≥ θ
The first condition ensures that each cloaking box has a safety level no less than θ. The
second condition is to guarantee that any combination of cloaking boxes also has a safety
level no less than θ. In other words, the adversary cannot correlate b with any cloaking boxes
disclosed previously to identify a region whose safety level is less than θ.
Clearly, a cloaking box needs to be as small as possible, because coarse location infor-
mation will result in inferior performance of routing protocols and applications. On the other
hand, it must not reduce the desired level of network safety protection. The challenges of
computing such a cloaking box are twofold. First, it must be computed without having to
request other nodes’ accurate position. In fact, whenever a node disclose its position, it can
only report a cloaking box, which must also meet the two safety requirements. Second, a node
generally cannot know all cloaking boxes other nodes have disclosed, making it difficult to
prevent the correlation attack.
4.1.2 Location cloaking techniques
In this section, we present our algorithms for cloaking box computing in stationary and
mobile ad hoc networks. Without loss of generality, we assume the network is deployed in a
rectangular domain D and the required level of network safety protection is θ, where S(D)
(i.e., the safety level of D) ≥ θ. Our basic idea is to partition domain D recursively into a
number of subdomains, each having a safety level of at least θ. The partitioning of a subdo-
main is always along its longer dimension. If two dimensions are equal, then always split on
the horizon. Figure 4.2 illustrates the processing of partitioning. Initially,D is partitioned into
two equal subdomains, R1 and R2. The partitioning is recursive in the sense that a subdomain
is further partitioned into two new subdomains as long as their safety levels are no less than θ.
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For instance, R1 is further partitioned into R11 and R12, and so R12 into R121 and R122. The
process of partitioning creates a binary partitioning tree (BP-tree), which records the domain
hierarchy. The root of the BP-tree is of depth one and each partitioning creates a new level.
At the end of partitioning, each node takes the leaf subdomain, which cannot be partitioned
further, as its cloaking box. An important characteristic of a BP-tree is that, given the root
domain D and a leaf partition P , a node can compute all subdomains in the path from D to P .
For example, a node in R121 knows that path D → R1 → R12 → R121.
We now consider how to do such partitioning in a fully distributed environment, where
each node needs to compute its cloaking box without knowing other nodes’ exact position. In
the following subsections, we first present our solution for a stationary ad hoc network, and
then extend it for a mobile ad hoc network, where the movement of nodes requires the domain
partitioning to be adjusted dynamically.
Figure 4.2 Example of BP-tree
4.1.2.1 Cloaking for stationary ad hoc networks
Suppose nodes are deployed simultaneously (e.g., distributed by an airplane) in a target do-
main D. For each node, its initial partition P is set to be D. Starting at time 0, the nodes refine
their partition distributively as follows round by round. In each round, each node broadcasts
a PLUS packet within its own partition P . The format of the packet is (PLUS, seqnum, P ),
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where seqnum is a global unique number used for dropping the redundant packet during the
broadcast (62). By counting the number of different packets it receives, a node knows the
number of nodes inside its current partition P . Let i be the number of the different packets.
P ’s safety level can then be computed as S(P ) = A(P )
i
. If S(P ) < 2 · θ, the node takes P as
its cloaking box (i.e., leaf subdomain). Otherwise, it divides its current partition P into two
equal halves (according to the rules discussed earlier) and sets P to be the one that contains its
current position. When a new round of refinement starts, it broadcasts (PLUS, seqnum, P )
to find the number of nodes inside P and computes the safety level of P . Each node repeats
this process until the safety level of its current partition is less than 2 · θ.
(0,0)
(1,1)
n1
X
Y
n2
n4
n5
n3
n7
n6
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n8
n10
(b)
Figure 4.3 Example of location cloaking in stationary ad hoc networks
Algorithm 4 is the pseudo code for each node to find its cloaking box. All nodes start to
execute this code right after they are deployed (at time t0). Since nodes have no idea of the
actual position of neighbors, we assume simple flooding is used for regional broadcast. That
is, when a node receives a packet (PLUS, seqnum, P ), it rebroadcasts the packet if it is inside
P and has not seen this packet (based on seqnum). Otherwise, it simply drops the packet. Note
that in each round of partitioning, a node needs to wait for a certain time period T . This is to
collect PLUS packets sent by other nodes in the same partition. Since the broadcast delay is
proportional to node population, we can preset the initial waiting time to some value (e.g., T0)
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and then cut 50% each round.
Algorithm 4 Cloak for stationary ad hoc networks
S-Cloak(D, θ) // executed by each node
1: p← my current position
2: seqnum← my unique id
3: P ← D
4: T ← T0
5: while true do
6: send packet (PLUS, seqnum,P )
7: wait(T) {wait until PLUS packets collection are finished}
8: i← the number of PLUS packets collected
9: s← A(P )
i
{Get P ′s safety level}
10: if s ≥ 2θ then
11: P ← Partition(P, p) {get the half partition that contains p)
12: T ← T2
13: else
14: return P
15: end if
16: end while
In the above process, a node reveals its location information in its PLUS packets. For each
(PLUS, seqnum, P ) packet, P ’s safety level is guaranteed to be no less than θ. Let P ′ be P ’s
parent partition, we have S(P ′) ≥ 2 · θ, since a node will not proceed to the next round of
partitioning unless the safety level of its current partition is at least 2 ·θ. Thus, even if all nodes
in P ′ are actually located inside P , P ’s safety level is still no less than θ. As a result, each
partition disclosed satisfies the safety requirement. The recursive domain partitioning also
makes correlation attack impossible because, given any two partitions P1 and P2, either they
do not overlap at all or one contains the other completely. As an example, consider Figure 4.3.
Suppose ten nodes are distributed in a square domain of [0, 1]2, and the safety requirement is
θ = 1
32
. We present a partition in the form of [(x1, y1), (x2, y2)], where (x1, y1) denotes the
position of its top left corner, and (x2, y2) for the bottom right corner. In the first and second
rounds, the safety levels of the partitions are all larger than 2θ. In the third round, each node
in partition [(.5, 0), (1, .5)] finds out that the safety level of its partition is 1
20
, which is less
than 2θ. Thus, they stop the partition process and use [(.5, 0), (1, .5)] as their cloaking box.
Similarly, in the fourth round, nodes n1, n2 and n3 determine [(.25,0),(0.5.5)] as their cloaking
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box, and in the fifth round, node n4 and n5 take [(.25, .5),(.5, 1)]. As we can see, nodes in a
denser region tend to have a larger cloaking box.
It is possible for an adversary to compromise some node and let it send multiple PLUS
packets to falsify cloaking results. This does not jeopardize the safety level of a cloaking box,
but artificially enlarges the cloaking box size. Such attack can be prevented by authentication
techniques (63; 43). The idea is to add a certificate field in the PLUS packet. The certificate
field allows a node to verify the sender of a packet and thus detect if multiple PLUS packets
have been sent from a same node. Alternatively, a compromised node may stay silent, not
sending any PLUS packets. In this case, the number of PLUS packets received is less than the
actual population inside a partition. This approach, however, does not reduce the safety level
of those uncompromised nodes since they rely on the actual PLUS packets they receive for
cloaking. Ultimately, the adversary is interested in locating and destroying the uncompromised
nodes.
4.1.2.2 Cloaking for mobile ad hoc networks
Location cloaking in the presence of node mobility is more challenging. Right after the
network is deployed, each node can find its initial cloaking box using the domain partitioning
technique discussed in the previous subsection. One minor change is the minimal safety level
that governs when a subdomain should be partitioned further. Given a partition P , its safety
level S(P ) downgrades when a node moves into it. Given the required safety level θ, the
maximum number of nodes allowed in P is nmax = ⌊A(P )θ ⌋. Thus, to ensure S(P ) no less
than θ before P is merged with some other partitions, S(P ) must be at least α · θ, where α,
referred to as P ’s safety coefficient, is equal to nmax
nmax−1
. Therefore, the domain partitioning
procedure goes to a subdomain P , only if the safety level of its parent partition is no less than
2α · θ.
We now consider how to adjust the domain partition dynamically as nodes move in and
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out of their cloaking boxes. After the initial partitioning, each node knows its partition and
uses that as its cloaking box. When nodes move, they monitor their own movement against
their current partition. If a node, say M , moves out of its current partition P , it notifies the
nodes inside of P by broadcasting them a LEAV E message, (LEAV E, seqnum, P ). When
receiving such a message, each node insideP computes P ’s new safety level. If S(P ) > 2α·θ,
it calls S-Cloak(P , θ) to split P , and determines its new cloaking box.
Algorithm 5 Cloak for mobile ad hoc networks
M-Cloak(θ)//exucte by each node
1: {monitor my movement against current partition P}
2: if crossing the boundary of P then
3: //update P
4: send packet (LEAV E, seqnum,P )
5: N(P )← N(P )− 1
6: s← A(P )
N(P )
7: if s ≥ 2α · θ then
8: wait(T) {wait until LEAVE broadcast is finished}
9: S − Cloak(P, θ) {split P}
10: end if
11: //find new cloaking box
12: {listen and eavesdrop ADVERTISE packet for P ′}
13: send packet (JOIN, seqnum,P ′)
14: N(P ′)← N(P ′) + 1
15: s← A(P ′)
N(P ′)
16: if s ≤ α · θ then
17: wait(T) {wait until JOIN broadcast is finished}
18: while true do
19: P ′ ← parent partition of P ′
20: calculate safety level of P ′ {as the same as is S-Cloak}
21: if S(P ′) ≥ α · θ then
22: set P ′ as new cloaking box
23: end if
24: end while
25: end if
26: end if
In addition to notifying its leaving, M also needs to find its new partition and announce
its coming to the nodes in the partition. We assume that each node in a partition P ′ peri-
odically broadcasts an ADVERTISE message, (ADV ERTISE, seqnum,N(P ′), P ′), where
P’ is its current partition. After receiving an ADVERTISE message with P ′ that contains its
current position, M takes P ′ as its current cloaking box, and then broadcasts a JOIN mes-
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sage, (JOIN, seqnum, P ′). Upon receiving a JOIN message, each node inside P ′ com-
putes the new safety level of P ′. If S(P ′) < α · θ, P ′ is not safe enough, each node takes
the parent partition of P ′ as its new cloaking box, and then broadcasts a MERGE message,
(MERGE, seqnum, P ′′), where P ′′ is the parent partition of P ′. When the nodes in P ′′
receive the MERGE message, they calculate the safety level of P ′′ by broadcasting PLUS
message in P ′′. If S(P ′′) > α · θ, the nodes inside P ′′ take P ′′ as their new cloaking box.
Otherwise, they repeat this merge process until they find a partition whose safety level is at
least α · θ.
The pseudo code of the cloaking update algorithm is given in Algorithm 5. To illustrate
this process, we use the same example in section 4.1.2.1. Due to the effect of the safety
coefficient α, the initial cloaking box of n4 and n5 is [(.25,.5), (.5, 1)] as shown in Figure 4.4
(a), which is different from that in the stationary network. Suppose the node n4 moves out of
its cloaking box. When n5 receives the LEAVE message sent by n4, it recalculate the safety
value of its cloaking box as 1
8
, which is larger than 2α · θ = 1
12
. Thus, this partition is split in
half and n5 will find its new cloaking box as [(.25,.5), (.5,.75)]. In addition, after receiving the
JOIN from n4, n1, n2 and n3 recalculate the safety value of their cloaking box as 132 which is
smaller than α · θ = 1
24
. Thus, they broadcast MERGE messages in the parent partition of the
current cloaking box. As a result, n1, n2, n3 and n4 will use partition [(0,0), (.5,.5)] as their
new cloaking box, which is shown in Figure 4.4 (b).
In the above process, a node reveals its location information in packets LEAVE, AD-
VERTISE, JOIN and MERGE. For each packet of (LEAV E, seqnum, P ), the location in-
formation in the packet cannot be used to locate the sender because the sender is outside P .
In addition, an ADVERTISE packet is broadcast in the sender’s cloaking box, whose safety
level is guaranteed to be no less than θ; a MERGE packet is broadcast in the parent partition
of sender’s cloaking box, whose safety level is also no less than θ. Comparing with LEAVE,
ADVERTISE and MERGE, JOIN packets involve a safety problem. When an adversary eaves-
drops a JOIN packet of (JOIN, seqnum, P ), it knows the population of P increases by one.
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Figure 4.4 Example of location cloaking in mobile ad hoc networks
Thus, if the adversary receives multiple JOIN packets in a short period, it may be able to infer
that the safety level of P downgrades below θ. To cope with this problem, a node should not
send JOIN packet immediately after it eavesdrops an ADVERTISE message. Instead, we let
a node wait for a random time period before it sends JOIN packet. During the waiting period,
if a node receives another JOIN packet, it waits for another certain period which ensures that
the eavesdropped JOIN packet has been broadcast in P . As long as it does not hear MERGE
packet during the waiting period, it sends its JOIN packet. Otherwise, it extends the waiting
time further until the merge process finishes. In this way, the JOIN packets are broadcast se-
quentially, and from perspective of the adversary, the safety level of P must be no less than θ
before merge happens.
An adversary may launch DOS attacks by inserting fake LEAVE or JOIN packets. Such
attacks can be prevented by simply letting nodes recalculate the population in their current
cloaking box before each split or merge.
In the above algorithms, we assume the network is fully connected. However, in the case
that the network is disconnected, the number of PLUS packets collected by a node may be less
than the actual population of a partition. In the mobile ad hoc networks, the movement of mo-
bile nodes may change the topology of the network. For example, suppose two disconnected
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groups of nodes are deployed in a same partition. Since they have no idea the existence of the
other group of nodes, every node uses the number of nodes in its own group to compute the
safety level of the partition, and thus the safety level is overestimated. When the two groups of
nodes move towards each other and become connected, the adversary may find out the safety
level of this cloaking box is lower than θ.
To prevent such threat caused by disconnection, we propose a simple strategy as follows.
As we know, a node can updates the population of its cloaking box when it receives corre-
sponding LEAVE and JOIN packets. Suppose the network is initially connected. After nodes
start to move, if a node finds the population of its cloaking box suddenly changes a lot, which
does not match the LEAVE and JOIN packets it received, it considers the network is dis-
connected. Then, the node can estimate the population of its cloaking box according to the
number of nodes in the connected group it belongs to. For example, suppose at the time that
network becomes disconnected, the node calculates the ratio r between the population before
disconnection and the number of nodes in the connected group. Then, the node estimates the
population of the cloaking box by timing r with the current population of the connected group.
Actually, a node can adjust the ratio r as necessary. If a larger r is chosen, the node tends to
overestimate the population, the cloaking boxes have high safety since the estimated popula-
tion is larger than the actual population with a high probability. However, overestimate may
lead to unnecessary partition merge. The resulting cloaking boxes with larger size deteriorate
the communication efficiency.
4.1.3 Analysis
In this subsection, we propose an analytical model to estimate control overhead involved
in the cloaking algorithms, which is measured by the number of control packets. Recall that in
our algorithms all the control packets are sent by regional broadcast. Because nodes do not re-
veal their positions, there is no neighborhood information available to help packet forwarding.
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Thus, we simply assume pure flooding, in which each sensor node has to forward data packet
as long as it is inside the broadcasting region. Specifically, the cost of broadcasting a packet
within a region is equal to the population of the region. We assume there are m wireless nodes
uniformly distributed in the network domain of size l × w, and we also assume l·w
m
≥ 2θ.
Because if l·w
m
< 2θ, according to Algorithm 4, we know that all nodes will use the entire
network domain as their cloaking box.
In the stationary ad hoc network, the cloaking boxes are calculated only once right after
the network is deployed. When calculating the population of a partition P , every sensor node
inside broadcasts a PLUS packet within P . The total number of packets is N2(P ), and the
cost for each node is N(P ). Under uniform distribution, the population of the partition is
approximately proportional to its size, and the population of a partition at depth k in the BP-
tree is m
2k−1
. Thus, the cost of a node when computing the population of a partition at depth k
in BP-tree can be estimated as C(k) = m
2k−1
. In addition, as explained in Algorithm 4, a sensor
node stops searching when it finds the safety level of a partition is less than 2θ. Under uniform
distribution, the cloaking box b of any sensor node has the same size. It contains only the node
itself, and it satisfies θ ≤ A(b)
N(b)
< 2θ. Thus, we can infer that b is the on the depth dmax =
⌊log2 l·wθ ⌋ in the BP-three. Therefore, the overall number of packets sent by a sensor node in
calculating its cloaking box can be estimated as Cinit =
∑dmax
i=1 C(i) = (2− 21−dmax)m.
In the mobile ad hoc network, the initialization of cloaking boxes is very similar with the
stationary ad hoc network. In the analysis, we focus on the cloaking box update and estimate
average number of control packets sent by a mobile node per time unit. Suppose b is a cloaking
box at the depth k in the BP-tree. When a node moves out of b, it broadcasts a LEAVE packet
within b, and the cost is Cleave = N(b). If the safety level of b becomes larger than 2αθ, b is
split, and every node inside b will recalculate its cloaking box by broadcasting a PLUS packet
in b’s child partitions. The cost Csplit is bounded by 12N
2(b) ≤ Csplit ≤ N2(b). The lower
bound denotes the cost when mobile nodes in b is uniformly distributed; the upper bound
denotes the cost when one of b’s child partition is empty. On the other hand, if a mobile node
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moves into b, a JOIN packet is broadcast inside b with cost Cjoin = N(b). If the safety level
of b downgrades lower than θ, every node in b broadcasts a MERGE packet within b’s parent
partition P (b), the cost of which is N(b)N(P (b)). Then all nodes in P (b) recalculate the
safety level of P (b) by broadcasting PLUS packets, the cost of which is N2(P (b)). Thus, the
total cost of the merging process is Cmerge = N(P (b))(N(P (b)) + (N(b))).
Suppose mobile nodes follow a random walk model, in which at every time unit, a mobile
node moves with a randomly picked direction and speed. According to (64), the time duration
that a randomly moving unit may stay in an area can be approximated as an exponential
distribution and the mean staying time is t = piA
E[v]L
, where A is the area, L is the perimeter of
the area, andE[v] is the average speed of the mobile unit. As discussed above, under uniformly
distribution, the cloaking boxes of mobile nodes are at depth dmax in the BP-tree. Thus, the
average time duration that a mobile host stays inside its cloaking box is t¯ = pi·l·w
2dmax−1E[v]L(dmax)
,
where L(k) = l
2⌊k/2⌋−1
+ w
2⌊(k−1)/2⌋−1
is the perimeter of a partition at depth k in the BP-tree.
Since the random walk does not change the uniform distribution, theoretically, neither split nor
merge happens during the movement of mobile nodes, and the control overhead is composed
of only LEAVE and JOIN messages. In reality, split and merge may happen but the frequency
must be very low. Thus, in the analysis, we only count the LEAVE and JOIN messages. Since
the cloaking boxes contain only one node, the cost of broadcasting LEAVE and JOIN is equal
to 1. Therefore, during cloaking update, the average number of control packets sent by a
mobile node per time unit can be estimated as Cupdate = 2t¯ .
4.1.4 Performance study
To evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes, we have developed a detailed sim-
ulator. We implemented a mobile ad hoc network in which a number of mobile nodes are
distributed in a rectangular domain. Our simulation consists of two phases: mobile nodes
first initiate their cloaking boxes using Algorithm 4, and then move following a random walk
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model and update their cloaking boxes whenever necessary using Algorithm 5. We are mainly
interested in two performance metrics:
• Cloaking area. This metric measures the potential impact of location cloaking on the
applications that rely on node location information. We measure cloaking area as the
average size of cloaking boxes used by each node in simulation. Since a node may
use different cloaking boxes, we compute its cloaking area using time weighted aver-
age. Suppose during a simulation time period of [0, T ], a node has its cloaking box
{a0, a1, · · · , ak} at time ticks {0, t1, · · · , tk}, respectively. The node’s cloaking area is
computed as a0·t1+
∑k−1
i=1 ai·(ti+1−ti)+ak ·(T−tk)
T
.
• Control overhead. This metric measures the communication cost incurred by location
cloaking. We evaluate two communication costs, Cinit and Cupdate, incurred in two
simulation phases, respectively. Cinit is the average number of control packets sent by
each node in the initial domain partitioning. This cost measures the communication
efficiency of Algorithm 4. On the other hand, Cupdate measures the communication cost
incurred after nodes start to move, and therefore evaluates the efficiency of Algorithm 5
It is defined as the average control packets sent by each node per time unit.
Table 4.1 summarizes the parameters used in our study. Unless otherwise specified, the
default values are used. When the distribution of nodes is uniform, the performance of our
techniques can be predicted with our analytical model. Thus, we focus on evaluate the per-
formance of our techniques under a non-uniform distribution. In our simulation, the initial
distribution of nodes follows a normal distribution. To ensure such a distribution, we partition
the networks into many small grid cells, and then deploy different number of nodes in cells so
that the node population in cells obeys a normal distribution approximately. The movement of
nodes follows a random walk. As such, as nodes continue to move, their distribution eventu-
ally become uniformed. Our simulation stops when the change of average cloaking box sizes
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become less than 5%. In the next subsections, we report how the two performance metrics are
affected by safety requirement θ, network density, and nodes’ moving speed.
Table 4.1 Simulation parameters
parameter range default unit
network domain 1000× 1000 1000× 1000 meter2
node number 200 - 700 400 unit
transmission radius 50 50 meter
node speed 1 - 5 3 meter/sec
safety requirement θ 20− 180 100 unit
4.1.4.1 Effect of safety level
In this study, we investigated the impact of safety level on the performance. We partitioned
the network domain into a number of grid cells, each being 20×20meter2, and deployed 400
nodes in the grid cells in a normal distribution with variance of 0.05, 0.1, and 0.5 respectively.
Here the variance is normalized by dividing grid cell population with the total number of
nodes. Thus, the larger the variance is, the more even the nodes are distributed. The value
of safety requirement is varied from 20 to 180, and the performance results are plotted in
Figure 4.5. Figure 4.5 (a) shows that the cloaking area is larger when the variance of the
distribution is more skewed. This is due to the fact that under a more uneven distribution,
more nodes are deployed closer in some small region, causing larger cloaking boxes for these
nodes. The figure also shows that the cloaking area under all three variance settings increases
as the safety requirement θ increases. Under the same distribution setting, a larger θ makes
it more difficult to find a small partition that has sufficient safety level. Figure 4.5 (b) shows
that Cinit is higher when the distribution is more skew. This can be explained as follows. The
cost that every node inside a partition broadcasts a PLUS message within it is equal to the
square of its population. Thus, when a partition is split, the total broadcasting cost in two
child partitions is less when the difference between their population is larger. Therefore, the
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more uneven distribution tends to have a higher init cost. The figure also shows that in all
the three distributions, Cinit decreases as θ increases. A smaller θ leads to smaller cloaking
boxes, which have larger depths in the BP-tree. This means the domain partition procedure
goes deeper in the BP-tree, thus incurring more control overhead.
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Figure 4.5 Effect of safety requirement
Figure 4.5 (c) shows that as the safety level increases, Cupdate decreases under distribution
with variance 0.5, but increases under distribution with variance 0.1 and 0.05. Under random
walk, the uneven distribution will become more and more uniform as the simulation runs. For
a distribution with a larger variance, the initial cloaking boxes are smaller. Partition splits or
merges happen less frequently, and the overall update cost is mainly composed of the LEAVE
and JOIN messages, the number of which is inversely proportional to the size of cloaking
boxes. By contrast, when the distribution is more skewed, many initial cloaking boxes are
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very large. Thus, more partition splits take place after the nodes start to move, thus generating
more control overhead.
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Figure 4.6 Effect of network density
4.1.4.2 Effect of network density
This study investigated the impact of network density on the performance of our cloaking
algorithms. We set θ = 100, and varied the node number from 200 to 700. The performance
results are shown in Figure 4.6. As showed in Figure 4.6 (a), the cloaking area increases as
the network becomes denser. In a non-uniform distribution, nodes are more densely deployed
in some regions, and given a distribution with certain variance, the node density in these
regions is proportional to the network population. Thus, the size of cloaking boxes increases
as the network population increases. Figure 4.6 (b) shows that Cinit increases linearly as the
network density increases. Since the cost of broadcasting one PLUS packet to every node in a
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partition is equal to the population of the partition, given a distribution with certain variance,
the population of a partition is proportional to the network population. Thus, the cost of
broadcasting a PLUS packet in the partition is also proportional to the network population.
Figure 4.6 (c) shows that as the network density increases, Cupdate for all three distributions
increases, and the increment is sharper when the distribution variance is smaller. As explained
in the previous study, when a distribution is more skew, more partition splits occur and thus
generate more control overhead. In addition, the cost of splitting a partition is proportional to
the square of the population of the partition.
4.1.4.3 Effect of node mobility
This study investigated the impact of node mobility on the performance of our cloaking
algorithms. We deployed 400 nodes in the network domain, and varied the speed of mobile
nodes from 1m/s to 5m/s. Under a random walk model, the distribution of mobile nodes will
become more and more even as time elapses. In order to study the effect of node mobility on
the distribution change, we ran all simulations within a same time interval. The performance
results are shown in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7 (a) shows that as the moving speed increases, the cloaking area decreases. This
is due to the fact that a higher mobility causes a skew distribution to become even faster. When
the distribution becomes even, the size of cloaking boxes is smallest. Figure 4.7 (b) shows
that the curves for Cinit are flat. Since this cost is measured before nodes start to move, it is
not affected by the node mobility. In contrast, as node mobility increases, Cupdate increases
under all the three distributions, as showed in Figure 4.7 (c). When the mobility is higher,
there are more events that nodes move out of their cloaking boxes. As the figure shows, the
increment of Cupdate becomes smaller when the mobility increases. This can be explained as
follows. When the average moving speed is higher, it takes less time for the node distribution
to become even. When the distribution is even, the majority update cost comes from LEAVE
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and JOIN, the frequency of which will become stabilized.
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Figure 4.7 Effect of node mobility
4.2 Location secure routing
The above cloaking techniques show that reducing the location resolution is effective in
protecting wireless nodes’ location safety. However, it has a significant impact on the geo-
graphic routing protocols in ad hoc networks. First, existing protocols may suffer efficiency
loss. For example, in order to deliver a packet to a destination node, we should broadcast the
packet in the node’s cloaking box, which incurs a lot of routing overhead. More importantly,
the operations of these protocols such as packet forwarding may allow an adversary to refine
a node’s location resolution, thus reducing the required level of protection.
As an example, consider Figure 4.8. It shows three nodes and the corresponding cloaking
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regions that they disclose 1. SupposeA sends a packet. If B forwards the packet, thenA would
know that B must be within its transmission range, thus allowing it to refine B’s location. To
prevent such location refinement, a node should avoid forwarding a packet unless its cloaking
region is completely covered by the sender’s transmission range. In this example, only C can
forward a packet originating from A. The problem is how a receiving node can determine if
this condition is satisfied. It may first appear that we can let the sender advertise its transmis-
sion radius. But doing this would place the sender in danger. If B knows A’s transmission
radius, it can refine A’s location based on the signal strength it receives. Indeed, even if a
node makes its transmission range known, such information cannot be trusted. This is due to
the fact that the node may be compromised and falsify the information for location refinement
attack.
A
B
cloaking region
A’s transmission range
C
Figure 4.8 Location refinement attack
Our research in this section investigates the impact of location cloaking on geographic ad
hoc routing protocols and introduce a new concept called safe link. A network link is said to
be a safe link if the packet delivery through the link does not allow an adversary to refine the
sender and receiver’s location resolution. Assuming asymmetric communication links, where
nodes keep their transmission radius in secret, we propose a solution that allows a node to de-
termine whether or not a link is safe based on the received signal strength. With this technique
in place, we propose a location secure routing protocol (LSR). Like existing protocols such as
1Throughout this chapter, we will use a dashed circle to denote a node’s cloaking region and a solid one its
transmission coverage.
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GPSR (3), LSR tries to route a packet using nodes closer to the destination whenever possible,
and if not, detours the packet along some faces in the network connectivity graph. However,
LSR constructs a routing path using only safe links. Moreover, it can work with inaccurate
location information. To our knowledge, LSR is the first ad hoc routing technique that is de-
signed with built-in mechanisms to prevent routing activities from being used to refine nodes’
location.
4.2.1 Safe link
We consider an ad hoc network deployed in a two-dimension space. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume each location reported by nodes is a cloaking circle. As mentioned early,
A node’s cloaking circle needs to contain the its position and satisfy other conditions, depend-
ing on the protection type (privacy or safety) and the level of protection. Since the focus of
this work is on the design of routing mechanism, we will not concern ourselves the details of
computing a cloaking circle, but simply assume some existing technique is used.
We assume the adversary has access to the communications among the networking nodes
(e.g., it can be one of these nodes) and know nodes’ location information which they disclose
in packet delivery. The adversary is interested in location refinement attack, which is to derive
more accurate location than reported. As discussed in the introduction, the key to prevent
such attack is to ensure that data packets are forwarded only through safe links. That is, when
a node receives a data packet, it should not forward the packet unless the cloaking circle it
discloses is completely covered by the sender’s transmission range. The problem is how to
verify this forwarding condition without knowing the sender’s transmission radius. Here we
present two approaches.
The first approach lets a node estimate if its cloaking circle is completely covered using
only the signal strength it receives. According to the Free Space Model (65), given a pair of
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sender and receiver with a distance of d, the signal strength at the receiver can be computed as
Pr = k
Pt
d2
, (4.1)
where Pt is the sender’s transmitting power (i.e., the signal strength at the sender site) and k
is a constant. Thus, given a received signal strength Pr, a node can estimate the distance that
the signal can be further propagated as d1 = (kPrPl )
1
2
, where Pl is the minimum signal strength
that is detectable to a node. Let d2 be the maximum distance from the node’s current position
to the boundary of its cloaking circle. If d2 ≤ d1, the receiving node can be assured that its
cloaking circle is within the sender’s transmission range.
The above scheme is simple to implement and guarantees zero false positive verification.
It, however, is a pessimistic solution as it assumes the worst situation: the sender is right on
the receiver’s position using the minimum transmission power. In reality, the sender can be
far away, which means that the actual transmission power is larger than the signal strength
sensed by the receiver. Since we assume each node is willing to disclose its cloaking circle,
and location verification techniques (e.g., (66; 67)) can be applied to verify the trustworthiness
of such information, we can take advantage of the cloaking circle disclosed by the sender to
estimate its transmission coverage.
Figure 4.9 (a) shows two nodes, A and B, and their corresponding cloaking circles CA
and CB. Suppose B receives a data packet sent by A and the received signal strength is Pr.
If B knows A’s exact position, B can compute A’s transmission power Pt = Pr·|AB|
2
k
, where
|AB| denotes the distance between A and B, and A’s transmission radius r = (kPt
Pl
)
1
2
, where
Pl is the minimum signal strength detectable to a node. B can then derive A’s transmission
coverage, which is the circle centered on A’s position with a radius of r, and check if CB is
within the coverage. The problem is, B does not know A’s exact position, but only knows that
it is inside CA. A simple solution is to compute A’s transmission coverage for every position
in CA. If each of these possible coverages contains CB , then B can forward the data packet.
This approach, however, requires intensive computation.
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To address the above problem, we have come up a more efficient approach. Let d1 = |BX|
be the shortest distance from B to the boundary of A’s transmission range. Let OB denote the
center of B’s cloaking circle CB , Y be the point that line AOB intersects with CB, and Z
be the point that AOB intersects with the boundary of A’s transmission range. Let B′ be the
point on line AOB such that |AB| = |AB′|, and d2 denote the length of segment B′Y . These
notations are illustrated in Figure 4.9 (a). Our solution is based on the following theorem.
A
B
X
boundary of A’s 
transmission range
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CB
Y
d1
d2'
B’
Z
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CA CA
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(b) Estimate the value of d1 and d2'
Figure 4.9 Safe link verification
Theorem 1. CB is entirely covered by A’s transmission range ⇐⇒ d1 ≥ d2.
Proof. First of all, since AOB overlaps with the diameter of CB , we have the equivalence: CB
is entirely covered by A’s transmission range ⇐⇒ |AZ| ≥ |AY |. In addition, since |AX| =
|AZ| which is the transmission radius, and |AB| = |AB′|, we have the equivalence: d1 ≥ d2
⇐⇒ |AX| ≥ |AY | ⇐⇒ |AZ| ≥ |AY |. Therefore, combining the two equivalences, we can
infer that CB is entirely covered by A’s transmission range ⇐⇒ d1 ≥ d2.
So the question now is how to compute d1 and d2. Let’s first consider d1. We know that
d1 = r−|AB| = P
1
2
t [(
k
Pl
)
1
2 − ( k
Pr
)
1
2 ]. Since Pl, k, and Pr are all fixed, d1 is determined by A’s
transmission power Pt, and a smaller Pt results in a smaller d1. According to Equation 4.1,
Pt =
|AB|2Pr
k
, Pt has a smaller value when A is closer to B. So Pt is smallest when A is at
W (see Figure 4.9 (b)), the point where line OAB intersects with the boundary of CA. As
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such, B can use the distance |WB| to compute the minimum value of Pt and then compute the
minimum value of d1. Clearly, as long as CA does not cover B’s position, the minimum value
of Pt is larger than Pr, and therefore, d1 will be larger than derived by the first approach.
Algorithm 6 Link safety verification
LinkStatus(p) // executed by each node
1: Pr ← receiving signal strength of p
2: CA ← cloaking circle of sender A
3: CB ← cloaking circle of receiver B
4: {estimate minimum d1}
5: W ← intersection of BOA and CA
6: dmin ← |WB|
7: Pmin =
Prd
2
min
k
8: d1 ← P
1
2
min[(
k
Pl
)
1
2 − ( k
Pr
)
1
2 ]
9: {estimate maximum d2}
10: compute two tangent lines A′OB and A′′OB
11: if B is in between A′OB and A′′OB then
12: d′2 ← |BOB|+R
13: else
14: d′2 = MAX{|A′OB| − |A′B|, |A′′OB| − |A′′B|}+R
15: end if
16: if d1 ≥ d′2 then
17: return SAFE
18: else
19: return UNSAFE
20: end if
We now consider d2. As shown in Figure 4.9 (a), d2 = |AY |− |AB| = |AOB|− |AB|+R
where R is the radius of CB. Since in the triangle △AOBB the length of edge BOB does
not change no matter where A is, |AOB| − |AB| has a larger value when the angle ∠ABOB
is larger and its maximum value is |BOB|. Therefore, B can first calculate the two tangent
lines of CA which pass through OB, denoted as A′OB and A′′OB , as illustrated in Figure 4.9
(b). If B is in between the two lines, |AOB| − |AB| has the maximum value when the angle
∠ABOB = pi and in this case the maximum value of d2 is equal to |BOB|+R. Otherwise, B
computes |A′OB|−|A′B|+R and |A′′OB|−A′′B|+R respectively and chooses the larger one
as d2’s maximum value. Thus, if the maximum d2 is no larger than the minimum d1, B can be
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assured that it is within A’s transmission range. We can see that this approach can compute
a more accurate maximum value of d2 as long as B is not in between the two tangent lines.
Thus, it generates less false negative verification of safe links. The pseudo code of the second
verification approach is shown in Algorithm 6.
4.2.2 LSR
We now consider how to construct a routing path with safe links and inaccurate location.
Each data packet has the following fields in its header: src pos (the location of the source
node), dst pos(the location of the destination node), fwr pos (the location of the node which
is forwarding this packet). When a source node sends a packet to a destination node, it fills in
src pos and dst pos. The field fwr pos is initialized with the sender’s location. When a node
forwards this packet, it updates the field with its own location.
Similar to other protocols like GPSR, the proposed LSR also works in two modes: 1)
greedy routing, which is used whenever possible; 2) face routing, which is used where greedy
routing does not work. We explain these two modes in the following subsections.
4.2.2.1 Greedy routing
When a node receives a packet, it computes whether the link is safe and whether it is closer
to the destination than the sender. If any one of the two conditions is not satisfied, the node
drops the packet. Otherwise, it waits for a certain time period. During the waiting time, if the
node eavesdrops the same packet forwarded by some other node, it drops the packet. Other-
wise, it forwards the packet. The length of the waiting period is set to be proportional to the
distance between the node and the packet destination. As such, a node closer to the destination
waits shorter and has a higher probability to forward. If a node forwards a packet, it also sends
an acknowledgement packet back to the sender with a transmitting power which is ensured
to cover the sender’s cloaking circle. If the sender does not receive any acknowledgement, it
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means there is no safe link to any other node closer to the destination. When this happens, the
packet forwarding switches to face routing mode, which we will discuss later.
The above strategy constructs packet routing path using only safe links. It is worth men-
tioning that this approach is also lightweight as it avoids proactive location advertising. In
existing protocols like GPSR, a forwarding node needs to know all of its neighbors’ position
in order to choose the next hop that is closest to the destination. For this purpose, every node is
required to periodically update its latest location to its neighbors. This not only incurs signif-
icant routing overhead, but also is subject to location refinement attack. When a node makes
frequent location updates, the time-series sequence of the corresponding cloaking areas may
be correlated to refine its location.
One problem of implementing the above routing scheme is how to compute the distance
between two nodes. To make a forwarding decision, a node needs to compute the distance
from the packet sender and itself to the destination node. Since no node reveals its exact posi-
tion, we estimate the distance between two nodes by measuring the average distance between
a pair of points in the two cloaking circles respectively, defined as follows:
D(C1, C2) =
1
A1A2
∫
C1
∫
C2
Dist(p1, p2) dp1 dp2, (4.2)
where C1 and C2 are the two cloaking circles; Dist(p1, p2) is the Euclid distance between a
position p1 in C1 and a position p2 in C2; A1 and A2 are the area of C1 and C2 respectively.
Another problem is how to deliver the packet to the destination node without knowing its
accurate location. It may first appear that we can simply apply the above routing scheme to
forward the packet and when the packet reaches the cloaking circle of the destination node,
a regional broadcast in the cloaking circle can be launched to accomplish the delivery. This
strategy, however, does not guarantee the packet delivery. Since nodes use the average distance
defined in Equation 4.2 to make a forwarding decision, the position where the packet enters the
cloaking circle of the destination node may not be the one that is closest to its actual position.
If the sub-network in the cloaking circle is not connected the packet may not be able to reach
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Figure 4.10 An example of delivery failure.
the destination node. In the example shown in Figure 4.10, the packet is forwarded to C in the
cloaking circle CD of destination node D. Since C cannot reach from D directly, the packet
delivery will fail even with a regional broadcast of the packet within CD. Yet, there actually
exists an external path from C to D, which is A→ B → E → D.
To cope with this problem, we proposed to involve more nodes in routing when a packet
reaches the cloaking circle of the destination node. If a node’s transmission range overlaps the
cloaking circle of the destination node, it will forward the packet as long as the link is safe,
no matter whether it is closer to the destination than the sender, and whether it eavesdrops the
packet forwarded by other nodes. In the same example as shown in Figure 4.10, the node B
will also forward the packet from A even though the packet has been forwarded by C. As a
result, the packet can reach the destination along the route A → B → E → D. The pseudo
code for our proposed greedy routing is given in Algorithm 7.
4.2.2.2 Face routing
When a node forwarding a packet does not have any neighbor that is closer to the destina-
tion and forms a safe link, the packet reaches a dead-end in greedy routing mode. When this
happens, the packet forwarding switches to face routing mode, in which the packet delivery
is detoured around the dead-end until a closer next-hop is found. The face routing in LSR
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consists of three components: 1) connectivity graph generation, 2) planarization, 3) packet
forwarding. We discuss them as follows.
Algorithm 7 LSR greedy routing
Greedy(p) // executed by each node
1: s← LinkStatus(p)
2: if s = UNSAFE then
3: drop packet and return
4: else
5: CD ← cloaking circle of the destination
6: if node’s transmission range overlaps with CD then
7: forward packet and return
8: else
9: d′ ← distance from node to destination
10: d′′ ← distance from sender to destination
11: if d′ ≥ d′′ then
12: forwarding ← false
13: else
14: forwarding ← true
15: end if
16: end if
17: end if
18: if forwarding = true then
19: wait T
20: if packet is forwarded by others during waiting then
21: drop packet
22: else
23: forward packet
24: end if
25: else
26: drop packet
27: end if
The first component constructs the network connectivity graph with safe links. Specifi-
cally, when a node A switches to the face routing, it locally broadcasts a query packet. When
receiving such a query, each of its neighbors verifies its link safety and sends an acknowledge
back if the verification result is positive. This allows A to figure out all its outgoing links
in the connectivity graph. Figure 4.11 (a) shows an example where a subnetwork containing
three nodes is mapped to the directed graph in Figure 4.11 (b). Note that since each node can
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have its own cloaking circle and transmission range, the safe links in the connectivity graph
are asymmetric, and such asymmetric links can lead to routing failures. This will be explained
later when we discuss the third component.
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Figure 4.11 An example of connectivity graph generation.
Similar to GPSR, face routing in LSR forwards a packet using right-hand rule. The correct
operation of right-hand rule requires the network connectivity graph be planar, which does
not contain cross links. Therefore, the second components in LSR planarizes the network
connectivity graph by removing the cross links. It is worth mentioning that in the presence
of location inaccuracy, planarization may disconnect the network. This problem has been
addressed in (68; 69). LSR just applies the techniques in these papers to ensure the network
connectivity after planarization.
The third component applies the right-hand rule and forwards a packet around the dead-
end until finding a closer next-hop to the destination. The major challenge is how to deal with
routing failures brought by asymmetric links in the network. In a planar graph, the connecting
line from the source to the destination must go through a number of open or close elementary
faces 2. If the connectivity graph is undirected, i.e., all links are symmetric, a packet will
be routed around these faces one by one using the right-hand rule from the source to the
destination. For example in Figure 4.12, a packet from S to D should be routed around faces
SAB, ABF , BEGF , and FGD consequently. In LSR, however, the network connectivity
2An elementary face is a face that does not contain other faces
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Figure 4.12 An example of face routing.
graph is directed. Simply applying the right-hand rule may not be able to route a packet
correctly, because sometimes a packet cannot be routed around the boundary of a face in a
directed graph. For example, as shown in Figure 4.12, when the packet reaches B, it cannot
be forwarded aroundBEGF since there is no link fromB toE. Following the right-hand rule,
the packet will be forwarded to C, and then it will loop around BCE until TTL is exhausted.
To solve this problem, we need to prevent the packet being routed in a face like BCE
which is not crossed by the connecting line from the source to the destination. Our strategy
is as follows. When a packet cannot be forwarded around a face F on the connecting line,
we deactivate the one-way link, say l′, which stops the packet forwarding (e.g., link EB in
Figure 4.12), and then route the packet around the face F′ which is composed of F and the
elementary face on the other side of l′. Since l′ is deactivated, F′ must be an elementary face
on the connecting line. In the example shown in Figure 4.12, LSR will route the packet around
face BCEGF .
Algorithm 8 shows the pseudo code for a node to relay a packet p in face routing mode.
We let every forwarding node include its identity in the routing header of the packet, and thus
all the en-route nodes who have forwarded this packet form a forwarding list in the header.
Then, when a new forwarding node selects a link using right-hand rule, it checks whether the
node on the other side of the link already exists in the forwarding list. If not, the node forward
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the packet on this link. Otherwise, it means that the packet is being forwarded around a face
not on the connecting line. Thus, the node deactivates this link and chooses the next available
link using right-hand rule. In the same example shown in Figure 4.12, when the packet reaches
E, nodes S, B and C has been included in the forwarding list. Following right-hand rule, E
selects link −−→EB first. But B exists in the forwarding list. Thus, E finds the next available link
−−→
EG. Since G is not in the forwarding list, E will forward the packet though this link. As a
result, the packet will be routed around face BCEGF , and finally reaches destination D.
Algorithm 8 LSR face routing
Face(p) // executed by each node
1: l ← link where p is sent from
2: L← forwarding list of p
3: while true do
4: {find next link using right-hand rule}
5: l′ ← RightHand(l)
6: if l′ = null then
7: {no link available}
8: drop packet and return
9: else
10: N ← node on the other side of l′
11: {check if this link should be deactivated}
12: if N ∈ L then
13: continue
14: else
15: {add N to forwarding list and forward packet}
16: L← L+N
17: forward packet and return
18: end if
19: end if
20: end while
4.2.3 Performance evaluation
For performance evaluation, we have developed a detailed simulator. We implement two
versions of LSR. The two schemes, which we will refer to as LSR-basic and LSR-adv, are
different in the way of verify link safety. In LSR-basic, a node receiving a data packet uses
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only the received signal strength to determine if it is safe to forward the data packet, while
in LSR-adv, a node would leverage both the signal strength and the location disclosed by the
sender. For comparison purpose, we have also implemented an approach referred to as Native.
This scheme lets a node forwards a received packet as long as it is closer to the destination
than the sender. However, unlike LSRbasic and LSRadv , this scheme lets a node forward a
data packet without verifying link safety and is therefore subject to location refinement attack.
We are mainly interested in two performance metrics:
• Cloaking area: The location disclosed by a node can be refined if the node participates in
data forwarding without considering link safety. The metric of cloaking area is defined
to be the size of a node’s cloaking circle known to an adversary after location refinement.
As such, this metric measures the degree that a node’s location can be refined. We report
the average cloaking area of all nodes.
• Delivery rate: This metric is defined to be the ratio between the number of data packets
that are successfully delivered to their destination and the total number of data pack-
ets transmitted. The delivery rate measures how reduced location resolution and the
forwarding conditions have impact on the routing performance.
Table 4.2 summarizes the parameters used in our study. Unless otherwise specified, the
default values are used. We simulate an ad hoc network in which nodes are deployed in
a rectangular domain. In each simulation, we generate a number of nodes and randomly
place them in a 1000 × 1000 m2 network domain. That is, each node’s coordinates in X
and Y axis are randomly chosen from [0, 1000]. After deployment, each node initializes its
exposing location as a cloaking circle with a radius randomly chosen from [r min, r max]. In
each simulation, we create a number of routing tasks, each containing a pair of source and
destination nodes which are selected randomly. During routing, a forwarding node randomly
chooses its transmission radius from [R min, R max]. In the next subsections, we focus on
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how the two performance metrics are affected by the initial size of nodes’ cloaking circles,
network density, and nodes’ transmitting power.
Table 4.2 Parameters
parameter range default unit
network domain 1000× 1000 1000× 1000 meter2
node number 800 - 1200 1000 unit
r min 20 20 meter
r max 40 - 80 60 meter
R min 60 60 meter
R max 100 - 200 150 meter
routing tasks number 300 300 meter
4.2.3.1 Effect of initial cloaking circle
This study investigates the impact of nodes’ cloaking circle size on the performance. We
generate 1000 nodes and deploy them randomly in the network domain. The value of max-
imum radius of nodes’ initial cloaking circle is varied from 40 to 80 meters, and the per-
formance results are plotted in Figure 4.13. Figure 4.13 (a) shows that Native results in a
much smaller cloaking area and thus fails to protect nodes’ location privacy/safety. Since this
scheme let a node forward a data packet as long as it is closer to the destination than the sender,
it is prone to the location refinement attack. In contrast, the proposed LSR lets a node avoid
forwarding a data packet whenever it determines that the link is not safe. As such, a node’s
location resolution known to an adversary is the same as that disclosed by the node. Note that
both LSR-basic and LSR-adv have this feature, so they share the same line.
Figure 4.13 (b) shows that both LSR-basic and LSR-adv have a smaller delivery rate than
Native, and the delivery rate decreases as the size of the cloaking circle increases. In LSR,
a packet is forwarded only via safe links. Thus, sometimes there is not a safe path from the
source to the destination even if the network is connected. When a cloaking circle increases,
the chance of its being totally covered by a node’s transmission range reduces. Thus, there
81
 1000
 3000
 5000
 7000
 9000
 40  50  60  70  80
Cl
oa
ki
ng
 ar
ea
 (m
2 )
Cloaking circle radius (m)
Native
LSR
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 40  50  60  70  80
D
el
iv
er
y 
ra
te
Cloaking circle radius (m)
Native
LSR-adv
LSR-basic
(a) (b)
Figure 4.13 Effect of cloaking circle
are less safe links in the network when the size of cloaking circles increases, making it more
difficult to find a safe route. Figure 4.13 (b) also shows that the delivery rate of LSR-basic
decreases much faster than that of LSR-adv. This indicates that the basic scheme has a much
higher false negative rate on safe link verification. When the size of cloaking circle is larger,
the number of safe links become too small for an end-to-end packet delivery. On the other
hand, as we can see the delivery rate of LSR is always more than 90%. It is worth mentioning
that Native has 100% data delivery rate. This, however, is achieved at the expense that the
location of nodes is known to an adversary more accurately.
4.2.3.2 Effect of network density
This study investigates the impact of network density on routing performance. We fix the
maximum radius of initial cloaking circle as 60 meters, and vary the node number from 800
to 1200. The performance results are plotted in Figure 4.14. As showed in Figure 4.14 (a),
the cloaking area of Native is always much lower than LSR, and it is not affected by network
density. This is due to the fact that in Native the next hop is always selected as the closest one
to the destination, and the distance between two consecutive forwarding nodes is not affected
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Figure 4.14 Effect of network density
by the network density. Figure 4.14 (b) shows that the delivery rate of Native is always 100%
which means the network is connected under all the above system settings. On the other hand,
the delivery rate of both LSR-adv and LSR-basic increases as the network become denser. In
a denser network, nodes are closer to each other and this results in more safe links. Thus, the
chance of having a safe path from a source to a destination is higher. We can also see that the
performance of LSR-basic is very sensitive to the network density. The the density is lower,
the delivery rate deteriorates quickly. In contrast, the performance of LSR-adv is much stable.
4.2.3.3 Effect of transmitting power
This study investigates the impact of transmitting power on the performance of the routing
protocols. We deploy 1000 nodes in the network domain, and vary nodes’ maximum transmis-
sion radius from 100 m to 200 m. The performance results are shown in Figure 4.15. Figure
4.15 (a) shows that as the transmitting power increases, the cloaking area of Native has a very
slight increment. This is due to the fact that only forwarding nodes’ location may be refined
and a larger transmission range decreases the hop number of the route between a pair of source
and destination. Figure 4.15 (b) shows that the delivery rate of both LSR-basic and LSR-adv
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Figure 4.15 Effect of transmitting power
increase as the transmitting power increases. It is because under the same network density, a
larger transmission range can cover more nodes’ cloaking circle, and thus generates more safe
links. More safe links in a network make it easier to find a safe route from a source to a desti-
nation. Figure 4.15 (b) also shows that LSR-basic is acceptable as a practical routing scheme
only when the nodes’ transmitting power is high, and comparatively LSR-adv is preferable in
most scenarios. In the previous study, we have seen a similar result.
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CHAPTER 5. Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis includes two of our research subjects, location privacy protection and location
safety protection. Their objectives are different but highly related. The major issue behind is
how to let wireless users disclose their location information to enable many network applica-
tions, while preventing such location being used to compromise their privacy and safety. In
summary, our contributions are:
Exploring historical location data for location privacy protection. Personal location
data can be correlated with restricted spaces such as home and office addresses for subject
re-identification. This is probably the most practical and economic way for an adversary to
identify the anonymous users of LBSs. Existing location depersonalization techniques pro-
posed to address this problem can support anonymous uses of LBSs, but not location privacy
protection. We proposed to explore users’ historical location data for location depersonaliza-
tion. A cloaking region with different footprints means it has been visited by different people.
Thus, if a user’s location is disclosed as such a region, even though an adversary can identify
all these visitors with restricted spaces, he will not know which of them was inside the area at
the time of the service request.
Feeling-based privacy modeling. In order to get a certain level of privacy protection, a
user needs to determine her privacy requirement. In this thesis, we address the challenge of
modeling location privacy requirement. We first show that the traditional K-anonymity model
is problematic, because privacy is about feeling, and it is difficult to scale one’s feeling using a
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number. Then we propose our solution which circumvents this problem by allowing a user to
identify her public region, a spatial region which she would feel comfortable that it is reported
as her location should she request a service inside it. Compared to choosing a number of
K, this feeling-based strategy provides a much more intuitive way for users to express their
privacy requirement.
Distributed location cloaking for location safety protection. We differentiate location
safety with location privacy. Here adversary in not interested in identifying a wireless node in
a network, but locating and destroying it. We propose to protect location safety by reducing
location resolution and we define safety level of a cloaking region. We identify three chal-
lenges of location cloaking and address these challenges by developing distributed cloaking
algorithms for both static and mobile ad hoc networks.
Secure location-based routing with cloaked location. We discuss the impact of loca-
tion cloaking on geographic routing protocols. Cloaked location downgrades the routing ef-
ficiency, and operations of routing will in turn jeopardize the safety protection provided by
location cloaking. Our research address this issue with a novel location secure routing pro-
tocol called LSR. In LSR, the routing packets are forwarded only on safe links which ensure
that adversaries cannot refine nodes’ location resolution by analyzing the routing traffic.
5.2 Future Research
We envision extending this research along the following directions:
Modeling and thwarting new types of location privacy intrusion in LBS. Our current
work considers only restricted space identification, but other types of attacks are likely. For
example, a user may be observed at some time. A user under direct observation does not
have location privacy, but the observed point may allow an adversary to learn her other visits.
Orthogonal to such observation attack is exclusiveness attack. If a user is known to never visit
a location, she cannot be the subject of any trajectory that contains the location. We will model
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and thwart these and other attacks that may be discovered during the course of this research.
Developing advanced safety cloaking algorithms. Our current design partitions the net-
work domain into subdomains and each node take some subdomain as its cloaking box. Since
the safety level of a subdomain can be up to 2θ, the cloaking box can be further refined to have
a safety level as close as possible to, but no less than, θ. A possible solution is to apply secure
multi-party computation (SMC) (22) that allows multiple nodes to jointly evaluate with their
private values while ensuring that no one can learn additional information other than the evalu-
ation results. In addition to such improvement, we will investigate differential safety cloaking,
in which different nodes may need different levels of safety protection. The motivation is that
instead of providing the same level of protection to all nodes, we can let less important nodes
report more accurate location to improve network efficiency. The main research effort will be
on preventing correlation attack. It would be interesting to see how such differential cloak-
ing can complement the existing anonymous routing protocols (e.g., (38; 41; 43)) for safety
protection.
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